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In this thesis, we study price optimization and competition of multiple differentiated sub-
stitutable products under the general Nested Logit model and also consider the designing
and pricing of new service products, e.g., flexible warranty and refundable warranty, under
customers’ strategic claim behavior.
Chapter 2 considers firms that sell multiple differentiated substitutable products and
customers whose purchase behavior follows the Nested Logit model, of which the Multino-
mial Logit model is a special case. In the Nested Logit model, customers make product se-
lection decision sequentially: they first select a class or a nest of products and subsequently
choose a product within the selected class. We consider the general Nested Logit model
with product-differentiated price coefficients and general nest-heterogenous degrees. We
show that the adjusted markup, which is defined as price minus cost minus the reciprocal of
the price coefficient, is constant across all the products in each nest. When optimizing mul-
tiple nests of products, the adjusted nested markup is also constant within a nest. By using
this result, the multi-product optimization problem can be reduced to a single-dimensional
problem in a bounded interval, which is easy to solve. We also use this result to simplify
the oligopolistic price competition and characterize the Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we
investigate its application to dynamic pricing and revenue management.
In Chapter 3, we investigate the flexible monthly warranty, which offers flexibility to
customers and allow them to cancel it at anytime without any penalty. Frequent techno-
logical innovations and price declines severely affect sales of extended warranties as prod-
uct replacement upon failure becomes an increasingly attractive alternative. To increase
sales and profitability, we propose offering flexible-duration extended warranties. These
warranties can appeal to customers who are uncertain about how long they will keep the
product as well as to customers who are uncertain about the product’s reliability. Flexibil-
ity may be added to existing services in the form of monthly-billing with month-by-month
commitments, or by making existing warranties easier to cancel, with pro-rated refunds.
This thesis studies flexible warranties from the perspectives of both the customer and the
provider. We present a model of the customer’s optimal coverage decisions under the ob-
jective of minimizing expected support costs over a random planning horizon. We show
that under some mild conditions the customer’s optimal coverage policy has a threshold
structure. We also show through an analytical study and through numerical examples how
flexible warranties can result in higher profits and higher attach rates.
Chapter 4 examines the designing and pricing of residual value warranty that refunds
customers at the end of warranty period based on customers’ claim history. Traditional
extended warranties for IT products do not differentiate customers according to their usage
rates or operating environment. These warranties are priced to cover the costs of high-usage
customers who tend to experience more failures and are therefore more costly to support.
This makes traditional warranties economically unattractive to low-usage customers. In
this chapter, we introduce, design and price residual value warranties. These warranties
refund a part of the upfront price to customers who have zero or few claims according
to a pre-determined refund schedule. By design, the net cost of these warranties is lower
for light users than for heavy users. As a result, a residual value warranty can enable the
provider to price-discriminate based on usage rates or operating conditions without the
need to monitor individual customers’ usage. Theoretic results and numerical experiments
demonstrate how residual value warranties can appeal to a broader range of customers and
significantly increase the provider’s profits.
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As technology is developing rapidly and competition becomes more severe, it is essential
for firms to work on the design and pricing of product portfolios to attract more customers
and earn more profit. Pinkberry, an ice cream maker and retailer, sells frozen yogurts with
different flavors and toppings; personal computer (PC) manufacturers produce different
PCs by using different CPUs, operating systems, screens with different size, memories
with different storage, and by attaching warranties with different coverage; airlines offers
different flight tickets with different seats, services and exchange/cancel policies; car mak-
ers differentiate cars by engines, transmissions, colors, optional packages, etc.
To obtain more market share, firms may increase product variety and offer multiple
substitutable products to earn broader market segments. When customers face multiple
substitutable products, they choose the one they like the most based on product features,
brand value, post-sale service and prices. Utility maximization theory says they always
select the product that gives them the most value. When there is uncertainty in the value
2function, probabilistic choice model arises and customers select each product with a cer-
tain probability. When the random terms are independent Gambul random variables, we
obtain the celebrated Multinomial Logit (MNL) discrete choice model. The MNL model
on substitutable products has received significant attention by researchers and has been
widely used as a model of customer choice, but it severely restricts the correlation patterns
among choice alternatives and may behave badly under certain conditions, in particular
when alternatives are correlated. This restrictive property is known as the independence
from irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property (see Luce 1959).
The Nested Logit (NL) has been developed to relax the assumption of independence be-
tween all the alternatives, modelling the ‘similarity’ between ‘nested’ alternatives through
correlation on utility components, thus allowing differential substitution patterns within
and between nests. Under the NL model, the customers make product selection decisions
sequentially: at the upper level, they first select a branch, called a “nest” that includes mul-
tiple similar products; at the lower level, their subsequent product selection is within that
chosen nest. Since its two-stage structure alleviates the IIA property, the NL model has be-
come very useful in contexts where certain options are more similar than others, although
the model lacks computational and theoretical simplicity. The main goals of Chapter 2
are to investigate optimal pricing under the NL model, to develop efficient computational
algorithms, to characterize the Nash equilibrium in Bertrand competition and to deliver
management insights through analytical and numerical results.
As product margins decline in increasingly competitive hardware markets, high-margin,
high-revenue aftermarket services such as extended warranties (EWs) are becoming critical
3to manufacturers’ profitability. Beyond direct profits, post-sales services are a critical lever
for influencing customer loyalty and improving brand image, and in commodity product
businesses, service quality and variety are important competitive differentiators. Through
the sale of innovative and attractive post-sales services, a manufacturer can enable its cus-
tomers to extract more use from their products, and increase customers’ loyalty. Not sur-
prisingly, improving service attach rates to hardware sales is a top strategic priority for
many original equipment manufacturers (OEMs).
OEMs face several important challenges to improve the sales of EW. The first is com-
petition from its own sales channel. Channel partners usually sell their own or third-party
extended service plans on OEM’s products, since they earn much higher margins on ser-
vices than on hardware. A second challenge is a perception among some customers that
EWs are not a good value. This perception may be due in part to the fact that most war-
ranties are offered at a uniform price regardless of usage. The price may be too high for
low-usage customers, and less than the support cost of some high-usage customers. This
leads us to the third challenge, which is how to price discriminate customers based on ex-
pected support when it is not possible, or it is too costly, to measure usage or to monitor the
environment where the product is used. Another challenge to sell EWs is the combination
of falling prices and rapid technology improvements experienced in some industries. A
good example is the PC industry. As prices decline, customers find the strategy of replac-
ing a failed product may compare favorably to buying an EW or paying out of pocket for
repairs.
To address these challenges, OEMs should consider introducing new services that can
4appeal to a broader range of customers. The first idea is flexible-duration service. Flexibil-
ity may be added to existing services in several different ways. For example, manufacturers
or third parties could offer a monthly-billed EW. Unlike a traditional, fixed-term EW, which
requires the customer to commit to and pay up-front for one or more full years of coverage,
a monthly EW allows customers to choose the duration of coverage with finer granularity
and pay on a monthly basis for the coverage.
Chapter 3 focuses on two of the factors that make flexible warranties attractive: the
customers’ uncertainty in the timing of replacement and their ability to learn about product
reliability. We discuss flexible warranties from the perspectives of both the customer and
the provider, and show through analysis and numerical examples how flexible warranties
can result in higher profits and higher attach rates.
Alternatively, one way to achieve market segmentation with a single EW product with-
out having to verify usage is through a residual value warranty (RVW). It is a finite-length
EW in which customers may receive a full or partial refund at expiration, in the form of
cash or a credit towards future purchases, where the refund size depends on the number
of claims made against the warranty. Customers who are not entitled to a refund are still
covered by the warranty. Like auto insurance policies, this type of EW rewards customers
for having few or no claims. It also provides “peace-of-mind” protection to customers,
without requiring customers to make extra payments at each time of a claim.
Chapter 4 concentrates on designing and pricing of the RVW so that the service prod-
uct can better price discriminate among existing users, or be attractive to a broader set of
users than the traditional warranty and at the same time be more profitable to the warranty
5provider. We investigate the benefits of offering an RVW and the implications of strategic
claim behavior – a strategic customer may decide to pay out of pocket for an inexpensive
repair rather than losing the residual value – on the optimal warranty design.
6Chapter 2
Price Optimization and Competition
under Nested Logit Model
2.1 Introduction
Rapid technology development makes multi-product pricing increasingly important, espe-
cially in competitive environments. Customers typically choose among a variety of com-
peting goods based on features, quality, brand, price, etc; the study of customers’ purchase
behavior among correlated products is necessary and possible as advances in information
technology and scientific analysis allow firms to collect large amount of data on sales, price,
product quality and variety, etc.
The Multinomial Logit (MNL) discrete choice model for substitutable products has re-
ceived significant attention by researchers from economics, marketing, transportation sci-
ence and operations management, and it has motivated tremendous theoretical research and
7empirical validations in a large range of applications since it was first proposed by McFad-
den (1980), who was later awarded the 2000 Nobel Prize in Economics. The MNL model
has been derived from an underlying random utility model, which is based on a probabilis-
tic model of individual customer utility. Probabilistic choice can model customers with
inherently unpredictable behavior– that shows probabilistic tendency to prefer one alter-
native to another. When there is a random component in a customer’s utility or a firm
has only probabilistic information on the utility function of any given customer, the MNL
model describes customers’ purchase behavior very well.
Hanson and Martin (1996) show that the profit function for a firm selling multiple
differentiated substitutable products under the MNL model is not concave in prices. Other
researchers follow different approaches and have observed that at the optimal solution the
markup, that is the price minus the cost, is constant across all the products of the firm (see
Anderson and de Palma 1992, Aydin and Ryan 2000, Hopp and Xu 2005 and Gallego and
Stefanescu 2011). The profit function is unimodal and there exist a unique optimal solution,
which can be found by solving the first order conditions (see Aydin and Porteus 2008 and
Akcay et al. 2010). Chen and Hausman (2000) study a product line selection problem under
the MNL model, restricting prices to discrete price points. They formulate a binary integer
program and show that the profit function is a quasi-concave and quasi-convex in the linear
relaxation.
While the objective function is not concave in the price vector, it turns out to be con-
cave with respect to the market share vector, which is in one-to-one correspondence with
the price vector. To the best of our knowledge, this result is first established by Song and
8Xue (2007) and Dong et al. (2009) in the MNL model and by Li and Huh (2011) in the
Nested Logit (NL) model. In all of their models, the product-specified price coefficients
are assumed identical for all the products of a firm. Empirical studies have shown the
product-specified price coefficients may vary widely and recognized the importance of al-
lowing different price coefficients in the MNL model (see Berry et al. 1995 and Erdem
et al. 2002). Unfortunately, the concavity with respect to market share vector is lost when
price coefficients are product-specific within a firm as shown through an example in this
chapter.
In a game-theoretic decentralized framework, the existence and uniqueness of a pure
Nash equilibrium in a price competition model depend fundamentally on the demand func-
tions as well as the cost structure. Milgrom and Roberts (1990) identify a rich class of de-
mand functions, including the MNL model, and point out that the price competition game
is supermodular, which guarantees the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium. Bernstein and
Federgruen (2004) and Federgruen and Yang (2009) extend this result for a generalization
of the MNL model referred to as the attraction model. Gallego et al. (2006) provide suffi-
cient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium under cost structure
that is increasing convex in the sale volume.
The MNL model has been widely used as a model of customer choice, but it severely
restricts the correlation patterns among choice alternatives and may behave badly under
certain conditions (Williams and Ortuzar 1982), in particular when alternatives are corre-
lated. This restrictive property is known as the independence from irrelevant alternatives
(IIA) property (see Luce 1959). If the choice set contains alternatives that can be grouped
9such that alternatives within a group are more similar than alternatives outside the group,
the MNL model is not realistic because adding new alternative reduces the probability of
choosing similar alternatives more than dissimilar alternatives. This is often explained with
the famous “red-bus/blue-bus” paradox (see Debreu 1952).
The Nested Logit (NL) model has been developed to relax the assumption of indepen-
dence between all the alternatives, modelling the ‘similarity’ between ‘nested’ alternatives
through correlation on utility components, thus allowing differential substitution patterns
within and between nests. The NL model has become very useful on contexts where certain
options are more similar than others, although the model lacks computational and theoret-
ical simplicity. The main goals of this chapter are to investigate its optimal solution, to
characterize the Nash equilibrium in Bertrand competition and to deliver management in-
sight through analytical results.
Williams (1977) first formulated the NL model and introduced structural conditions
associated with its inclusive value parameters, which are necessary for the compatibility
of the NL model with utility maximizing theory. He formally derived the NL model as
a descriptive behavioral model completely coherent with basic micro-economic concepts.
McFadden (1980) generated the NL model as a particular case of the generalized extreme
value (GEV) discrete-choice model family and showed that it is numerically equivalent
to Williams (1977). The NL model can also be derived starting from Gumbel marginal
functions by McFadden (1980). Later on, Daganzo and Kusnic (1993) pointed out that
although the conditional probability may be derived from a logit form, it is not necessary
that the conditional error distribution be Gumbel.
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To keep consistent with micro-economic concepts, like random utility maximization,
certain restrictions on model parameters that control the correlation among unobserved
attributes have to be satisfied. One of the restrictions is that nest coefficients are required
to lie within the unit interval, i.e., 0 ≤ γi ≤ 1. Borsch-Supan (1990) points out that this
restriction leads too often rejection of the NL model. Liu (2006) and Cachon and Kok
(2007) consider the NL model with identical price coefficients for the products of the same
firm and have characterized the Nash equilibrium. Moreover, Li and Huh (2011) study the
same model with nest coefficients 0 ≤ γi ≤ 1 and have derived the unique equilibrium in
a closed-form expression involving the Lambert W function (see Corless et al. 1996). In
all these models, the product-specified price coefficients for the products of the same firm
are assumed identical. However, empirical studies have shown that the product-specified
price coefficients βis varies widely, even for the products offered by the same firm (see
Berry et al. 1995). Borsch-Supan (1990) and Herriges and Kling (1996) point out that all
discrete choice model underlying density function should be viewed as an approximation to
real consumer behavior. They relax that unit interval constraint and modify the NL model.
However, the NL model with general nested coefficients and product-differentiated price
coefficients is hard to optimize, in particular in a decentralized system where each firm tries
to maximize her own profit. Our paper consider the general NL model for which we show
that the adjusted markup, which is defined as the unit price minus the unit cost minus the
reciprocal of the price coefficient, is constant across all the products of each firm. We use
this result to develop efficient algorithms and characterize the Nash equilibrium.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we consider the
11
general Nested Logit model and show that the adjusted markup is constant across all the
products of a firm. We use this result to simplify the multi-product pricing problem to an
optimization problem in an bounded single-dimensional interval. Section 2.3 considers the
centralized system, where the objective is to maximize the total profit from all the products
in all the nests. In Section 2.4, we investigate the oligopolistic price competition problem,
where each firm sells multiple substitutable products. In general, the Nash equilibrium
exists and a sufficient condition for the uniqueness of the equilibrium is also provided.
Section 2.5 is the application to dynamic pricing and revenue management. In Section 2.6,
we consider an extension to other Nested Attraction models and conclude with a summary
of our main results and useful management insights for application in business.
2.2 Nested Logit Model
The Multinomial Logit (MNL) model has been widely used to study customer choice be-
havior in marketing, economics, transportation science and operations management. How-
ever, it exhibits the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) property, which implies
that the ratio of probabilities of choosing any two alternatives is independent of the avail-
ability and attributes of a third alternative. In reality, adding new alternative hurts the
similar alternatives more than dissimilar alternatives and the empirical studies have shown
that the MNL model doesn’t work well when a firm has multiple substitutable products,
especially when the products are correlated. The Nested Logit (NL) model is a popu-
lar generalization of the standard MNL model and its structure with a two-stage process
12
alleviates the IIA property. Under the NL model, the customers make product selection
decisions sequentially: at the upper level, they first select a branch, called a “nest” that
includes multiple similar products; at the lower level, their subsequent selection is within
that chosen nest (see McFadden 1976, Carrasco and Ortuzar 2002 and Greene 2007). The
IIA property no longer holds when the two alternatives don’t belong to the same nest.
Suppose that there are n firms in the market and firm i sells mi differentiated substi-
tutable products that constitute nest i. Customers’ product selection behavior follows the
NL model: they first select a firm or a brand and then choose a product within their chosen
firm or brand. Let Qi(pi,p-i) be the probability that a customer selects firm i at the upper
level; and let qk|i(pi) denote the probability that product k of firm i is selected at the lower
level, given that the customer selects firm i at the upper level, where pi = (pi1, pi2, . . . , pimi)
is the price vector of firm i and p
-i = (p1, . . . ,pi−1,pi+1, . . . ,pn) is the price vector for all
other firms. Following Williams (1977), McFadden (1980) and Greene (2007), Qi(pi,p-i)









where αis can be interpreted as the “quality” of product s in nest i, βis ≥ 0 is the product-
specified price coefficient for that product, Il = log∑mls=1 eαls−βls pls represents the attrac-
tiveness of nest l, which is the expected value of the maximum of the utilities of all the
products in nest l (see Anderson et al. 1992), and γi > 0 can be viewed as a measure of
13
interfirm heterogeneity. When 0 < γi < 1, products are more similar to each other within
nest i than from other nests; when γi = 1, products of nest i have the same degree of sim-
ilarity as products of other nests, and the NL model reduces to the standard MNL model;
when γi > 1, products are more similar to products from other nests. The probability that a
customer will select product k of firm i, which can also be considered the market share of
that product, is
piik(pi,p-i) = Qi(pi,p-i) ·qk|i(pi). (2.3)
Note that ∑mik=1 qk|i(pi) = 1 and ∑mik=1 piik(pi,p-i) = Qi(pi,p-i). Liu (2006) and Li and Huh
(2011) consider a special case of the NL model, where the price coefficients βis are identical
for all the products of firm i.











, ∀ k 6= i,
∂pii j(pi,p-i)
∂pls
= βlsγlpii j(pi,p-i)pils(pl,p-l)≥ 0, ∀ l 6= i.
Each product’s market share is decreasing in her own price and increasing in the prices of
competitors’ products. The monotonicity of a product’s market share with respect to the
prices of other products of the same firm depends on 1− γi(1−Qi(pi,p-i)): it is increasing
14
if γi ≤ 1; it may decrease if γi is sufficiently large since a decrease in the probability of
brand selection may overwhelm demand recovery to other products within the firm.
The NL model is a generalization of the standard MNL model, which corresponds to
the case when γi = 1 for all i = 1,2, . . . ,n, and
piik(pi,p-i) =
eαik−βik pik
1+∑nl=1 ∑mls=1 eαls−βls pls
.
Without loss of generality, assume that the market size is normalized to 1. In the NL
model, given that the competitors choose prices p
-i, the problem for firm i is to determine







The profit function Ri(pi,p-i) is not a quasi-concave in pi (see Hanson and Martin 1996
for a counterexample), so other researchers, including Song and Xue (2007), Dong et al.
(2009), have taken different approaches to establish the structure of the MNL profit func-
tion. They express profit as a function of choice probabilities and show that it is jointly
concave. These authors assume identical price sensitivities with each firm, but their ap-
proach does not carry through to product differentiated sensitivities within firms.
In the NL model, denote a











Combining with equation (2.2) results in














































The pricing optimization problem under the NL model has been transformed to the
optimization problem in market shares as discussed above. Li and Huh (2011) have ex-
amined the NL model with nest coefficient γi ≤ 1 and identical price coefficients within
each firm (may be different across firms) and proven that the total profit is jointly con-
cave with respect to market shares and used this result to analytically compare the optimal
monopoly solution to oligopolistic equilibrium solutions. However, their approach cannot
16
easily extend to the NL model with γi > 1 or product-differentiated price coefficients. We
will present an example to show that the profit function is not concave in market shares
for the general NL model and then present our approach to the problem which exploits the
structure of optimal prices.
Taking the first and second order derivatives of the profit function (2.6) with respect to
































































Observe that the second order derivative ∂
2Ri(pii,p-i))
∂pi2i j
is independent of a
-i, the attractiveness
of other firms and even αis, the qualities of all the products in the same nest. A necessary
condition for the concavity of Ri(pii,p-i) in pii is
∂2Ri(pii,p-i))
∂pi2i j
≤ 0, ∀ pii j. (2.7)
Example 2.1. Assume that firm i sells two products with product-differentiated price coeffi-
cients βi = (0.9,0.1) and nest coefficient γi = 0.1. Figure 2.1 demonstrates the relationship
between the second order derivative ∂
2Ri(pii,p-i))
∂pi2i1
with respect to the market share pii2 of prod-




0.05≤ pii2 ≤ 0.24, then Ri(pii,p-i)) is not concave in all of her feasible region.
17
Figure 2.1: Non-concavity of Ri(pii,p-i))


















We will next take a different approach to consider the price optimization problem under
the general NL model. The first order condition (FOC) of the profit function (2.4) is
∂Ri(pi,p-i)
∂pi j
= pii j(pi,p-i) ·
[







Roots of the FOC (2.8) can be obtained by either setting the inner of the square bracket
term to zero, resulting in
1−βi j(pi j − ci j)+βi j(1− γi(1−Qi(pi,p-i))) · mi∑
s=1
(pis− cis)qs|i(pi) = 0, (2.9)
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or by setting pii j(pi,p−i) = 0 which requires pi j = ∞. There are 2mi potential solutions to
the FOC depending on the set Fi of products with finite prices. We first consider price op-
timization given the set Fi of products to offer at finite prices and will discuss the selection
of offered product set later. Finding the optimal solution to problem (2.4) typically requires
searching an mi-dimensional space and we will show below how to solve it based on a
single dimensional search, regardless of the number of products.
Equation (2.9) can be rewritten as follows:





(pis− cis)qs|i(pi), ∀ j ∈ Fi. (2.10)
Because the right hand side (RHS) of equation (2.10) is independent of product index j,
then pi j − ci j − 1βi j is constant for each j ∈ Fi. We will call θi = pi j − ci j −
1
βi j the adjusted
markup for firm i which is a constant at optimality (local or global) for each firm. A similar
result for the standard MNL model has been observed by Aydin and Ryan (2000), Hopp
and Xu (2005) and Gallego and Stefanescu (2011). Li and Huh (2011) also point out that
the markup is constant in the NL model with identical price coefficients.
We will abuse the notations a bit below without much ambiguity. The original pricing
problem (2.4) can be simplified to the following optimization problem with single decision
variable:
RFii (θi,θ-i) = QFii (θi,θ-i)(θi +wFii (θi)) (2.11)
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where
Ii = log ∑
s∈Fi
eα˜is−βisθi, Il = log
ml∑
s=1














α˜ls = αls−βlscls−1, ∀l,s.
It is easy to verify the following:
∂QFii (θi,θ-i)
∂θi
= −γiQFii (θi,θ-i)(1−QFii (θi,θ-i))vFii (θi)≤ 0,
∂QFii (θi,θ-i)
∂θ j
= γ jQFii (θi,θ-i)QFij (θ j,θ- j)v
Fj
j (θ j)≥ 0, ∀ j 6= i,
∂qFik|i(θi)
∂θi
= (−βik + vFii (θi))qFik|i(θi),
where vFii (θi) = ∑k∈Fi βikqFik|i(θi). The total market share of firm i is decreasing in her own
adjusted markup and increasing in competitors’ adjusted markups. The monotonicity of a
specific product’s chosen probability within a nest with respect to the adjusted markup of
the nest, given that the nest is selected, depends on the comparison of the price coefficients:
if the product is the least (most) price sensitive, her market share is increasing (decreasing)
in her adjusted markup from Lemma 2.1; otherwise, the monotonicity is not clear.
There are some monotonic properties for functions wFii (θi) and v
Fi
i (θi).
Lemma 2.1. (a) wFii (θi) is increasing in θi and 1maxs∈Fi βis ≤ w
Fi
i (θi)≤ 1mins∈Fi βis .
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(b) vFii (θi) is decreasing in θi and mins∈Fi βis≤ vFii (θi)≤maxs∈Fi βis. Furthermore, wFii (θi)vFii (θi)≥
1 ∀ θi,Fi, and all the inequalities become equalities when βis is identical for all s ∈ Fi.





mins∈Fi βis because w
Fi
i (θi) is increasing and bounded by 1mins∈Fi βis and
v
Fi
i (θi) is decreasing and bounded by maxs∈Fi βis.
Will the optimal profit increase if another product, say x, is added to the product set
Fi? Denote the new set as F+i := Fi ∪ {x}. We will next compare maxθi RFi (θi,θ-i) to
maxθi RF
+
i (θi,θ-i). Example 2.2 below shows that R
F+i
i (θi,θ-i) is not always great than
RFii (θi,θ-i) for all θi.
Example 2.2. Suppose that there are three available products with α˜i =(0.7256,6.3544,8.0862)
and βi = (0.6422,1.0721,1.7322) and the nest coefficient is γi = 0.8945. Assume a-i = 0
for simplicity. Let Fi = {1,2} and F+i = {1,2,3}. Figure 2.2 demonstrates the comparison







We will describe how to transform a multi-product pricing problem to a problem where
the aggregate market share is the control and then use this result to find the optimal product
set to offer. Suppose the offered product set is Fi for firm i and let ρi be the total aggregate
obtained market share, a new decision variable. Let rFii (ρi,p-i) be the maximum achievable
21
Figure 2.2: Comparison between Offering all and Offering partial






















expected profit with the constraint that the total market share is equal to ρi, i.e.,
r
Fi
i (ρi,p-i) := maxpi<∞ ∑k∈Fi(pi,k− ci,k)piFii,k(pi,p-i)




i (pi,p-i) = max0≤ρi≤1 r
Fi
i (ρi,p-i). Similarly, we can show that the adjusted
markups for all the products in set Fi are constant at the optimal prices. Note that θi and ρi













where θi is the unique solution to QFii (θi,θ-i) = ρi.
When another product x is offered at a finite price, will it increase the optimal profit
under the same market share constraint? Next, we will compare rFii (ρi,p-i) and r
F+i
i (ρi,p-i).







As a consequence of Proposition 2.1 it is optimal to offer all products at finite prices
so the optimal offer set is Fi = {1, . . . ,mi} for all i. Without further notice we will omit
the notation Fi from now on unless stated. We now state our main condition for price
optimization under the general NL model:
Condition 2.1. γi ≥ 1 or maxs βismins βis ≤
1
1−γi .
Note that both the standard MNL model (γi = 1) and the NL model with identical price
coefficients and γi < 1 satisfy Condition 2.1. When γi > 1, it corresponds to the scenario
where products are more similar cross nests; when 0 < γi < 1, it refers to the case where
products in the same nest are more similar, so the price coefficients of the products in the
same nest should not vary to much and the condition maxs βis
mins βis ≤
1
1−γi is reasonable. Condition
2.1 will be used in Proposition 2.2 to establish important structural results.
Proposition 2.2. (a) The adjusted markups are constant and the optimal price vector, de-
noted as p∗i , can be expressed as follows




i ∀ j = 1,2, . . . ,mi, (2.14)
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where θ∗i is a root of















If Condition 2.1 is satisfied, θ∗i is the unique root to the FOC (2.15).
(b) Under Condition 2.1, Ri(θi,θ-i) is unimodal with respect to θi and ri(ρi,p-i) is concave
in ρi.
Note that θ∗i doesn’t have to be positive in general, but it must be strictly positive when
the nest coefficient γi ≤ 1 because the total profit can be expressed as θi +(1− 1γi )wi(θi),
where θi is a solution to equation (2.15). Consequently, when γi > 1, it may be optimal
to include ‘loss-leaders’ as part of the optimal pricing strategy. More specifically, it may
be optimal to include products with negative adjusted markups (positive margins) for the
purpose of attracting attention to the nest.
If Condition 2.1 is satisfied, the profit function Ri(θi,θ-i) is unimodal in θi and ri(ρi,p-i)
is concave in ρi, so the FOC is sufficient to determine the optimal product prices and the
optimal solution is unique, which can be easily found by several well known algorithms for
unimodal or concave functions, like binary search and golden section search; if Condition
2.1 is not satisfied, Ri(θi,θ-i) may not be unimodal in θi as illustrated in the following
example. .
Example 2.3. Assume that firm i sells five products with parameters for the NL model: α˜i =
(1.9769,0.5022,0.6309,0.6013,0.0841)and βi =(0.6720,1.1249,1.0247,0.7968,0.0150).
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Figure 2.3: Non-unimodality of Ri(θi,θ-i))
















The nest coefficient γi = 0.9150. The total attractiveness of non-purchase and other firms
is 1+a
-i = 500. Note that maxs βismins βis =
1.1249
0.0150 = 74.99 >
1
1−γi = 11.76 so Condition 2.1 is not
satisfied. Figure 2.3 clearly shows that Ri(θi,θ-i) is not unimodal in θi and there are three
solutions to the FOC (2.15) in the interval (1,10): (1.910,0.144765), (2.984,0.144719)
and (4.736,0.144779). Observe that the maximum relative profit difference is very small:
(0.144779−0.144719)/0.144719= 0.04%. This suggests that Ri(θi,θ-i) is very flat at the
peak and any solution to the FOC (2.15) can be considered a good approximation to the
optimal adjusted markup.
However, a global optimal adjusted markup can be found in a bounded interval when
Condition 2.1 is not satisfied.
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γi mins βis . The optimal adjusted markup is
between 0 and θmax when Condition 2.1 is not satisfied.
The price optimization problem in an mi-dimensional space is reduced to a single di-
mensional search in a bounded interval. There are several well developed algorithms that
can be employed to solve it efficiently.
The Corollary follows immediately for the special cases: the standard MNL model and
the NL model with identical price coefficients.
Corollary 2.1. If γi = 1 or βis is identical for all s = 1,2, . . . ,mi, denoted as βi, the optimal
prices are unique and can be expressed in (2.14), where θ∗i is, respectively, the unique




















In this section, we consider the centralized system, where all the firms are controlled by a











The FOC of function R(p) is
∂R(p)
∂pi j
= pii j(pi,p-i) ·
[













Roots of the FOC can be found by either setting pii j(pi,p-i) = 0, which requires pi j = ∞
or letting the inner term of the square bracket equal 0, which is equivalent to










Similar to Proposition 2.2, it is optimal to sell all the products at finite prices such that
the adjusted markups are constant for all the products in the same nest and the result is








When the price coefficients are constant for all the products in each nest, i.e., βis = βi








ˆQi(θi,θ-i)(θi + 1βi )
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. It is the standard MNL
model, which is easy to solve as shown in Corollary 2.1.
For the general NL model with product-differentiated price coefficients, the FOC of the
total profit R(θ) in (2.18) is
∂R(θ)
∂θ j







θ j +(1− 1γ j )w j(θ j)
)]
= 0.
Again, because v j(θ j) ≥ mins β js > 0, the solutions to the above FOC can be found by
either letting Qi(θi,θ-i) = 0, which requires θi = ∞ or setting the inner term of the square
bracket equal to zero, which is equivalent to





Proposition 2.4 says that no nest would be priced out by charging infinity and equation
(2.19) is satisfied at the optimal prices for each nest j = 1,2, . . . ,n. The RHS of equation
(2.19) is independent of nest index j, so at the optimal solutions θ j + (1− 1γ j )w j(θ j) is
constant for all j, denoted as φ. Note that θ j +w j(θ j) = ∑m jk=1(θ j + 1β jk )qk| j(θ j) is the
average markup of nest j, so we here call θ j +(1− 1γ j )w j(θ j) adjusted nested markup for
nest j. Thus, problem (2.18) can be reduced to an optimization problem with respect to
adjusted nested markup in a single-dimensional space,
maxφ R(φ) def= ∑ni=1 Qi(θi,θ-i)(θi +wi(θi)),
where θi +(1− 1γi )wi(θi) = φ, ∀i = 1,2, . . . ,n.
(2.20)
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Profit R(φ) is an implicit function expressed in terms of θi, but there is a one-to-one
mapping between θi and φ under Condition 2.1 for each i because ∂∂θi
(




γi (1− (1− γi)wi(θi)vi(θi))> 0.
The price optimization can also be transformed to an optimization problem with respect
to the total market share. Let R(ρ) be the maximum achievable total expected profit given
that the total market share ∑ni=1 Qi(pi,p-i) = ρ.
R(ρ) def= maxp ∑ni=1 ∑mik=1(pik− cik)piik(pi,p-i)
s.t., ∑ni=1 Qi(pi,p-i) = ρ.
(2.21)
Proposition 2.4. (a) It is optimal to offer all the products in each nest at prices such that
equation (2.17) is satisfied, which implies that pi j − ci j − 1βi j is constant for all j of
each nest i.
(b) Under Condition 2.1 for each i= 1,2, . . . ,n, it is optimal to charge the adjusted markup
for each nest such that equation (2.19) is satisfied, which implies that θi+(1− 1γi )wi(θi)
is constant for all i.
(c) Under Condition 2.1 for each i = 1,2, . . . ,n, function R(φ) is unimodual in φ and the
optimal solution to problem (2.20) is unique, denoted as φ∗. The the optimal solution
to the original problem (2.16) is also unique and the optimal prices can be written in
terms of






where θ∗i is the unique solution to
θi +(1− 1γi )wi(θi) = φ
∗. (2.23)
(d) Under Condition 2.1 for each i = 1,2, . . . ,n, the maximum achievable profit R(ρ) is
concave in the aggregate market share ρ.
An interesting observation is that the optimal φ∗ is equal to the optimal profit and φ∗
is the maximum fixed point of R(φ). If Condition 2.1 is satisfied for each i, the concave
or unimodal optimization can be used to find the optimal ρ∗ and φ∗ as well as the optimal
adjusted markups θ∗ and optimal prices p∗; if Condition 2.1 is not satisfied for some i, the
optimal φ∗ can be found in a bound interval.




γi mins βis . The optimal φ∗ is between 0 and
φmax when Condition 2.1 is not satisfied for some i.
2.4 Oligopolistic Competition
We will next consider oligopolistic price competition with multi-product firms, where each
firm determines prices for all their own products simultaneously to maximize their own
total expected profit. We assume that each firm controls multiple products that constitute a
separate nest.
The oligopolistic price (Bertrand) competition with single and multiple products under
the standard MNL model has been widely examined and the existence and uniqueness of
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Nash equilibrium have been established (see Gallego et al. 2006, Allon et al. 2011). Li and
Huh (2011) have studied price and quantity competition under the NL model with identical
price coefficients for all the products of each firm. However, their approach cannot easily
extend to the general NL model with product-differentiated price coefficients. To the best
of our knowledge, our paper is the first to study oligopolistic competition with multiple
products under the general NL model with variant price coefficients.
From Proposition 2.1, it is optimal for each firm to offer all the products at finite prices.
In the price competition game, the expected profit for seller i is




where pi = (pi1, pi2, . . . , pimi) and p-i = (p1, . . . ,pi−1,pi+1, . . . ,pn).
From equation (2.11) and Proposition 2.2, each firm’s problem can be reduced to a
problem with single decision variable as follows
Game II: Ri(θi,θ-i) = Qi(θi,θ-i)(θi +wi(θi)).
We remark that Ri(θi,θ-i) is log-separable. Because the profit function Ri(θi,θ-i) is
unimodal with respect to θi under Condition 2.1, then it is also quasiconcave in θi because
quasiconcavity and unimodality are equivalent in a single dimension space. The quasi-
concavity can guarantee the existence of the Nash equilibrium (see, e.g., Nash 1951 and
31
Anderson et al. 1992), but there are some stronger results without requiring Condition 2.1
because of the special structure of the NL model.
Proposition 2.6. (a) Game I is equivalent to Game II, i.e., they have the same equilibria.
(b) Game II is strictly log-supermodular; the equilibrium set is a nonempty complete lat-
tice and, therefore, has the componentwise largest and smallest elements, denoted as
θ∗ and θ∗ respectively. Furthermore, the largest equilibrium θ∗ is preferred by all the
firms.
The multi-product price competition game has been reduced to an equivalent game
with single decision variable for each firm. The existence of Nash equilibrium has been
guaranteed and the largest one is a Pareto improvement among the equilibrium set.
2.4.1 Uniqueness of Equilibrium
To examine the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium, we will concentrate on Game II,
which is equivalent to Game I from Proposition 2.6. First, we consider a special case: the
symmetric game. Suppose that there are n firms and that all the parameters (αi,βi,γi) in
the NL model and the cost vector ci are the same for each firm i. Some further properties
of the equilibrium set can be derived.




We remark that Condition 2.2 is stronger than Condition 2.1 and they are closer for
larger n (they coincide when n goes to infinity).
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Proposition 2.7. (a) Only symmetric equilibria exist for the symmetric game discussed
above.
(b) The equilibrium is unique under Condition 2.2.
We will next state sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in
the general case:
Condition 2.3. (a) Denote Ψ as the region such that
−∂Qi(θi,θ-i)∂θi > ∑j 6=i
∂Qi(θi,θ-i)
∂θ j
, θ ∈ Ψ, i = 1,2, . . . ,n.
(b) Denote Ωi as the region such that θi +wi(θi) is log-concave in θi ∈ Ωi, i = 1,2, . . . ,n.
Note that the NL model with identical coefficients, i.e., βls is identical for all l and s;
γi is constant for all i, satisfies all the requirements in Condition 2.3 for any θ. Condition
2.3(a) is a standard diagonal dominant condition (see e.g., Vives 2001) and it says that a
uniform increase of the adjusted markups by all n firms would result in a decrease of any





γ jQ j(θ j,θ- j)v j(θ j). (2.24)















Q j(θ j,θ- j),










mini γi minl,s βls
maxi γi maxl,s βls−mini γi minl,s βls . (2.25)
From inequalition (2.25), Condition 2.3(b) can be satisfied when the adjusted markups
θi are sufficiently large for all the firms.
Since each firm sells all her products at positive margins, θi +wi(θi) ≥ 0. Then, Con-
dition 2.3(b) can be implied by a stronger condition that θi +wi(θi) or wi(θi) is concave in




w′′i (θi)(θi +wi(θi))− (w′i(θi))2
(θi +wi(θi))2
≤ 0,
where w′i(θi) = ∂wi(θi)/∂θi and w′′i (θi) = ∂2wi(θi)/∂θ2i .
When θi is large enough, Condition 2.3(b) can also be satisfied without requiring the
concavity of θi +wi(θi) or wi(θi).
Lemma 2.2. There exist a threshold ˜θi for each firm i such that θi +wi(θi) is log-concave
for θi ≥ ˜θi.
Tatonnement process can reach equilibrium under some mild condition. In the basic
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tatonnement process, firms take turns in adjusting their price decisions and each firm reacts
optimally to all other firms’ prices without anticipating others’ response, which can be
interpreted as a way of expressing bounded rationality of agents. In each iteration, firms
respond myopically to the choices of other firms in the previous iteration and the dynamic
process can be expressed below.
Tatonnement Process: Select a feasible vector θ(0); in the kth iteration determine the
optimal response for each firm i as follows:
θ(k)i = arg maxθi∈Ωi∩Ψ
Ri(θi,θ(k−1)
-i ). (2.26)
Proposition 2.8. Suppose θ∗ is an equilibrium under Condition 2.3,
(a) θ∗ is the unique pure Nash equilibrium of Game II.
(b) The unique pure Nash equilibrium θ∗ can be computed by the tatonnement scheme,
starting from an arbitrary price vector θ(0) in the region (⋂ni=1 Ωi)⋂Ψ, i.e., θ(k) con-
verges to θ∗.
Example 2.4. Consider an example with two firms and each firm sells two products. The
demand follows the NL model. For firm 1, α˜1 = (1.0,2.0), β1 = (0.6,0.8) and γ1 = 0.75;
for firm 2, α2 = (0.8,1.1), β2 = (0.7,1.2) and γ2 = 0.5.
The Nash equilibrium of Game II is θ∗ = (6.11,4.00). Figure 2.4 shows the tatonnement
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Figure 2.4: Convergence of Tatonnement Process













process converges to the Nash equilibrium θ∗ from three different initial points (1,1),
(10,1) and (5,8) respectively and all the pathes converge to θ∗ very fast.
2.4.2 Competition with Multiple Nests
To earn more market share as well as more profit, a firm may attract more customers by
increasing product variety. We will consider oligopolistic price competition in a more
complicated environment, where each firm controls multiple nests of products. Let Ni be
the set of nests controlled by firm i, then her profit function is
max
pNi






where pNi = (pl)l∈Ni is the price vector for all the products in the nests of firm i and p-Ni is
the price vector for all other firms. From Propositions 2.4, it is equivalent for each firm to
consider the following simplified optimization problem in single dimension:
maxφ RNi(φi,φ-i)
de f
= ∑l∈Ni Ql(θl,θ-l)(θl +wl(θl)),
where θl +(1− 1γl )wl(θl) = φi, ∀l ∈ Ni.
By a similar argument to Proposition 2.6, the above two games are equivalent. Moreover,
RNi(φi,φ-i) is unimodal in φi under Condition 2.1 in φ from Proposition 2.4, so there exists
a Nash equilibrium for the simplified game as well as the original game.
2.5 Dynamic Pricing
In this section, we consider the application of the main results to the traditional revenue
management problem, where a firm sells multiple substitutable products over a finite hori-
zon and the inventory cannot be replenished during the selling season (see Gallego and van
Ryzin 1997). For notational simplicity, the cost for each product is assumed to be zero and
the salvage value of remaining capacity is also assumed to be zero. The problem with a
constant cost or a constant salvage value per unit would result in a similar formulation. The
time horizon is discretized to T periods and each time interval is tiny enough that the prob-
ability that more than one customers arrive is negligible. Customers’ purchase behavior
is influenced by the price vector in that period and their product selection follows the NL
model.
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Assume that the firm is a monopolist and we will omit the firm index in this section.
Suppose the firm sells m products and let p = (p1, p2, . . . , pm) be the price vector. Assume
that the customer arrival process is is a nonhomogeneous Poisson process with rate λt in
period t. Without loss of generality, we assume that the total attractiveness from non-
purchase and all the competitors is normalized to 1. Then, the probability that a customer
chooses product k, given the price vector p is







)γ · eαk−βk pk∑ms=1 eαs−βs ps (2.27)
2.5.1 Single Resource
First, we consider the problem where all the products consume a common resource (see,
e.g., Maglaras and Meissner 2006). Let x denote the number of remaining units of capacity
at the beginning of period t, and t be the time-to-go. Let J(x, t) be the expected revenue-to-
go function starting at state (x, t). The Bellman equation is the following,











+ J(x, t−1), (2.28)
where ∆J(x, t−1) = J(x, t−1)−J(x−1, t−1) is the marginal value of the resource at state
(x, t−1). The boundary conditions are J(0, t) = 0 and J(x,0) = 0.
Let R(p) = ∑mk=1 pkpik(p) and ρ = ∑mj=1 pik(p). Then, λt ·R(p) is the total revenue rate
and λt ·ρ is the aggregate rate of capacity consumption in period t. Abusing notation a bit,
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we define,
r(ρ) de f= maxp ∑mk=1 pkpik(p)
s.t., ∑mk=1 pik(p) = ρ.
(2.29)
Similarly to Proposition 2.14, the optimal prices, denoted by (p∗1, p∗2, . . . , p∗m), to problem
(2.29) are unique for each ρ ∈ (0,1) and can be expressed as p∗k = ck + 1βk +θ
∗(ρ), where











where α˜s = αs−βscs−1 for s = 1,2, . . . ,m.
The value λt · r(ρ) is the maximum achievable revenue rate at period t subject to the
constraint that all products jointly consume capacity at a rate λt · ρ. Then, the Bellman
equation (2.28) can be rewritten as follows
J(x, t) = λt max
0≤ρ≤1
{r(ρ)−ρ∆J(x, t−1))}+ J(x, t−1). (2.30)
The multi-product dynamic pricing problem has been reduced to a dynamic pricing
problem in single dimension (2.30). If there exists an inverse demand function that maps
the market shares into a corresponding vector of prices, the revenue function R(p) can be
expressed in terms of demand rate. Maglaras and Meissner (2006) point out that if the rev-
enue function is continuous, bounded and strictly concave in demand rate, the maximum
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achievable revenue r(ρ) is concave with respect to the aggregate rate of capacity consump-
tion ρ. However, we have shown that the revenue rate is not jointly concave in market
shares (which refers to the demand rate here) under the NL model in Section 2.2. But, the
maximal achievable revenue is concave in the aggregate rate under the NL model under
Condition 2.1 (see Section 2.2), so we can use concave maximization to solve the dynamic
pricing problem backward (see Gallego and van Ryzin 1994 and Maglaras and Meissner
2006). Furthermore, as shown in Section 2.2, the optimal prices exist and are unique at
each state.
2.5.2 Multiple Resources
In the previous subsection, all the products consume the same common resource. In this
subsection, the products are stocked at the finished product level and cannot be replenished
during the selling season. Dong et al. (2009) and Akcay et al. (2010) have studied the prob-
lem under the standard MNL model and Li and Huh (2011) have considered the NL model
with identical price coefficients for the products of the same firm. We will next investigate
the problem under the general NL model with product-differentiated price coefficients.
Let x = (x1,x2, . . . ,xm) denote the vector of the inventory levels. The Bellman equation
is the following











+ J(x, t−1), (2.31)
where ∆kJ(x, t− 1) = J(x, t− 1)− J(x− ek, t− 1) if xi ≥ 1; ∆kJ(x, t− 1) = ∞ otherwise,
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and ek is an all-zero vector except the kth entry of 1. When a product is sold out it can be
eliminated from the consideration set, which is equivalent to pricing it at infinity. At state










Notice that in the above optimization, the stock-out product is automatically priced at
infinity and the consideration set only includes products with positive inventory. From
Proposition 2.2, the optimal price vector can be expressed as follows




where θ∗ is one of the roots to the following















that maximize R(θ), where α˜s = αs−βs∆sJ(x, t−1)−1. If Condition 2.1 is satisfied, θ∗
is the unique root to equation (2.32); if it is not satisfied, the optimal θ∗ can be found in a
bounded interval from Proposition 2.3.
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2.6 Extension and Discussion
Discrete choice model is one of the most popular models to study customer choice behavior
when multiple substitutable products are available. While the acceptance and application
of the popular MNL model are adversely affected by the IIA property, the NL model with
a two-stage process has been generalized and it alleviates the IIA property.
2.6.1 Extension: Non-purchase in a Nest
In the NL model, at the second stage customers are assumed to select one product within
the nest they chose at the first stage. As an extension, non-purchase may also be an option
at the second stage. Let ai0 refer to the attractiveness of non-purchase option in nest i and
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The first order condition (FOC) of the profit function (2.4) under the NL model with
non-purchase option in a nest is
∂Ri(pi,p-i)
∂pi j
= QNi (pi,p-i)qNk|i(pi) ·
[








Similar to Proposition 2.2, we can prove that the adjusted markup is also constant for
all the products in the same nest at optimal prices and the optimization can be simplified to
a single-dimensional problem with respect to the adjusted markup.
2.6.2 Extension: Nested Attraction Model
Market share attraction models have received increasing attention in the marketing liter-
ature and it specifies that a market share of a firm is equal to its attraction divided by
the total attraction of all the firms in the market, including the non-purchase attraction,
where a firm’s attraction is a function of the values of its marketing instruments, e.g., brand
value, advertising, product features and variety, etc. As an extension, we will consider the
generalized Nested Attraction models, of which the NL model is a special case. Again,
its two-stage structure can alleviate the IIA property, imposed by the standard Attraction
model.
We have already considered price optimization and competition for multiple products







where ais(pis) is the attractiveness of product s of firm i at price pis and it is continu-
ously twice-differentiable in pis, and Il = log∑mls=1 als(pis) is the total attractiveness of firm
i. Note that ais(pis) = eαis−βis pis for the MNL model as discussed above; for the linear
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model ais(pis) = αis−βis pis, αis,βis > 0; for the modified CES model ais(pis) = αis p−βisis ,
αis > 0,βis > 1. In the Nested Attraction model, the probability that a customer will select
product k of firm i is similarly defined as follows:
piik(pi,p-i) = Qi(pi,p-i) ·qk|i(pi).









(pi j − ci j)+ ai j(pi j)
a′i j(pi j)





The above FOC is satisfied when either βi jpii j(pi,p-i)a
′
i j(pi j)
ai j(pi j) = 0, which requires a
′
i j(pi j) = 0,
or the inner term of the square bracket is equal to zero
(pi j− ci j)+ ai j(pi j)
a′i j(pi j)
−(1− γi(1−Qi(pi,p-i))) · mi∑
s=1
(pis− cis)qs|i(pi) = 0. (2.33)
The following Proposition 2.9 says that it is optimal to offer all the products at prices
such that (pi j− ci j)+ ai j(pi j)a′i j(pi j) is constant for all j, denoted as ηi.
Condition 2.4. (a) a′i j(pi j)≤ 0, 2(a′i j(pi j))2 > ai j(pi j)a′′i j(pi j) ∀ j, pi j.
(b) That a′i j(pi j) = 0 implies that (pi j− ci j)ai j(pi j) = 0.
That a′i j(pi j) ≤ 0 says that each product’s attractiveness is decreasing in its price; that
2(a′i j(pi j))2 > ai j(pi j)a′′i j(pi j) can be implied by a stronger condition that ai j(pi j) is log-
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concave in pi j, which is equivalent to (a′i j(pi j))2 > ai j(pi j)a′′i j(pi j). Condition 2.4(b) re-
quires that ai j(pi j) converges to zero at a faster rate than linear functions when a′i j(pi j)
converges to zero. In other words, when a′i j(pi j) = 0, that product doesn’t contribute any
profit so it can be removed from the profit function.
It is straightforward to verify that the MNL model, the linear attraction model and the
modified CES model all satisfy Condition 2.4. Furthermore, there is a one-to-one mapping
between pi j and ηi for all j because ∂∂pi j
(
(pi j− ci j)+ ai j(pi j)a′i j(pi j)
)
=
2(a′i j(pi j))2−ai j(pi j)a′′i j(pi j)
a′i j(pi j)
<
0 under Condition 2.4.
Then, Problem (2.4) under the general Nested Attraction model can be simplified to the
optimization problem in single dimension as follows
maxηi Ri(ηi,η-i)
de f
= Qi(pi,p-i) ·∑mik=1(pik− cik)qk|i(pi),
where (pi j− ci j)+ ai j(pi j)a′i j(pi j) = ηi.
(2.34)
Proposition 2.9. Under Condition 2.4, it is optimal to offer all the products at prices such
that equation (2.33) is satisfied, which implies that (pi j − ci j)+ ai j(pi j)a′i j(pi j) is constant for all
j = 1,2, . . . ,mi.
Proposition 2.9 also holds when there is a non-purchase option in a nest. The Corollary
follows immediately for the special cases: the Nested linear attraction model and the Nested
modified CES model.
Corollary 2.2. The following quantities are constant at optimal prices for
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attraction model and the Nested modified CES model, respectively:
2pi j − ci j − αi jβi j ,
(1− 1βi j )pi j − ci j.
The multi-product pricing problem can be simplified to a problem in single dimension.
For the modified CES model, to keep (1− 1βi j )pi j − ci j constant, the less price sensitive
products, corresponding to smaller βi j, should be priced high, which is consistent to the
practice in business.
It is not hard to show that Ri(ηi,η-i) is log-supermodular for the general Nested Attrac-
tion model under Condition 2.4, so Proposition 2.6 also holds here.
2.6.3 Discussion and Conclusion
Discrete choice model is one of the most popular models to study customer choice behavior
when multiple substitutable products are available. The standard Multinomial Logit (MNL)
discrete choice model has been well studied and widely used in marketing, economics,
transportation science and operations management, but it suffers the IIA property, which
limits its application and acceptance, especially in the scenarios with correlated products.
The Nested Logit (NL) model with a two-stage process has been generalized and it can
alleviate the IIA property. Empirical studies have shown that the NL model works well in
the environment with differentiated substitutable products.
This chapter considers price optimization and competition for multi-products under the
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general NL model. We investigate the general NL model with product-differentiated price
coefficients and nest-heterogenous degrees in a large range. Optimization analysis shows
that the adjusted markup is constant across all the products of each firm. Besides, the
adjusted nested markup is constant for each nest when considering the optimization of
multiple nests of products. By using this result, the multi-product optimization problem
can be simplified to a single-dimensional problem in a bounded interval. We also use this
result to characterize the Nash equilibrium and the equilibrium can be quickly found by the
Tatonnement process.
Furthermore, we consider its application in dynamic pricing and revenue management,
and establish structural results of the optimal policy. Revenue management and dynamic
pricing have been well investigated in the last couple of decades and it has been widely
used in practice for management of airlines, hotels, rental cars, cruises, etc. Significant
revenue benefits have been documented from this scientific management. With the help
of our theoretical analysis on the general NL model, customer purchase behavior will be
deeply characterized and a new direction in marketing management will arise. Our research
work will shine bright light on the application of the NL model and deliver important
management insights in business.
We have also studied the general Nested Attraction model, of which the NL model is
a special case, and have shown how it can be transformed to an optimization problem in
a single-dimensional space. The two-stage model can alleviate the IIA property and have
derived high acceptance and wide use in practice. In the future, the research and practice on
customers’ selection behavior with three or even higher stages may attract more attention
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because it may be closer to customers’ rationality. One of other future research directions
may consider the heterogeneity of customers and investigate the choice model in the context
with multiple heterogenous market segments.
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Chapter 3
Flexible Duration Warranties with
Dynamic Reliability Learning
3.1 Introduction
As manufacturers face decreasing profit margins on hardware products, post-sales services
like extended warranties (EWs) are increasingly important to their profitability. In addition
to providing higher margins than hardware, services help extend the useful life of products,
generate a profitable revenue stream of consumables and accessories over the product’s
lifetime, and provide an opportunity to improve customer loyalty and brand image.
Gallego et al. (2009) describe several challenges that manufacturers face in improving
the sales of EWs. Among these is a perception among some customers that EWs are not
a good value (see a survey on ConsumerReports.org). This perception may be partly due
to the fact that most warranties are offered at a uniform price regardless of how products
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are used. Some customers, because of their usage rate, operating environment, or other
factors, may be susceptible to more product failures and thus be more expensive to support
than others. Residual value EWs (see Gallego et al. 2010), EWs with deductibles and co-
payments, and usage-limited EWs are service concepts that allow customized prices based
on expected support cost and thus attract more customers.
Another challenge to sell EWs is the combination of falling prices and rapid technology
improvements experienced in some industries. A good example is the personal computer
(PC) industry. As prices decline, customers find the strategy of replacing a failed product
may compare favorably to buying an EW or paying out of pocket for repairs. Typically, the
decision tilts more towards replacement when the replacement product has new features
and is offered at an attractive price. One response in Internet forums discussing extended
warranties explains typical preference for product replacement over extended warranty cov-
erage for low cost products: “If my $280 netbook breaks 1-3 years down the road, most
likely I can afford to plunk down another $299 for a netbook with many more bells and
whistles and power.”
To address these challenges, service providers should consider introducing flexible-
duration services that can appeal to a broader range of customers. Flexibility may be added
to existing services in several different ways. For example, manufacturers or third parties
could offer an EW with coverage commitments and payments made on a periodic basis,
e.g., monthly or quarterly. Unlike a traditional, fixed-term EW, which requires the customer
to commit to and pay up-front for one or more full years of coverage, a periodic EW allows
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customers to choose the duration of coverage with finer granularity and pay on a periodic
basis for the coverage.
Monthly warranties are available on the market today. For example, Sprint offers an
Equipment Service & Repair Program (ESRP) for smart phones at $7.00 per month. ESRP
can be added to devices within 30 days of activation or upgrade and can be canceled any-
time at no cost. Monthly Warranty, a third party service provider, offers extended war-
ranties with monthly payments and with the flexibility to control their coverage duration
for TVs, appliances, electronics, cameras and PCs.
Alternatively, service providers may continue to charge up-front for long-term EW cov-
erage, but make the service easier to cancel, and provide pro-rated refunds. Offering these
refunds in the form of cash or check increases the flexibility in customers’ eyes, while pay-
ing refunds in the form of credit, applicable to future purchases of providers’ hardware or
services, can reduce attrition to other hardware and service brands and increase the long-
term value of customers to providers. In addition, a flexible EW can be designed with
varying degrees of flexibility. For example, the contract may require that coverage begins
early in the life of the product, particularly if it is difficult to verify whether the basic prod-
uct is fully functioning at the time coverage begins. The EW contract may stipulate that
coverage may not be resumed once it is terminated. Furthermore, the terms may include an
early-termination fee for cancellation before a given length of time. An EW provider may
benefit by offering a menu of flexible EWs with different prices and cancellation terms, to
differentiate customers by their willingness to pay and desire for flexibility.
A flexible duration EW may appeal to customers for a variety of reasons. Periodic
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billing can attract customers with cash-flow constraints or high discount rates, who would
prefer low monthly or quarterly payments to a large lump-sum payment. There is evidence
from the monthly prices offered by providers that customers are even willing to pay a pre-
mium for the combination of flexibility and monthly billing. Moreover, customers who
buy low-priced products may have severe budget constraints and may opt to allocate all or
nearly all of their budget at the time of purchase to the product itself. A flexible warranty
with deferred monthly payments does not compete as directly with the product budget and
may be more palatable than a warranty with an up-front payment. Beyond its cash-flow
advantages, a flexible EW allows customers to hedge against several kinds of uncertainty.
Those who are uncertain about their future financial state will value the flexibility to termi-
nate coverage at any time. Customers may also be uncertain of how much they will like the
product. And in industries with rapid technological innovation, such as consumer electron-
ics, customers may not know how soon they will wish to upgrade to a newer product with
more features. Customers might also be unsure of the product reliability, and therefore the
necessity of coverage; a flexible duration service allows the customer to learn about the
product’s reliability over time without a costly long-term commitment.
This chapter focuses on two of the factors that make flexible warranties attractive: the
customers’ uncertainty in the timing of replacement and their ability to learn about product
reliability. We discuss flexibility in the form of a monthly warranty, with monthly payment
and month-by-month coverage commitments, although the results apply to any choice of
period length in commitment and payment schedule, and indeed to cancellable warranties
that are paid up front. The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the
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literature related to flexible services. Section 3.3 presents a model of customers’ dynamic
coverage decisions under a monthly warranty, with reliability learning and uncertainty in
the time when the customer replaces the product. Section 3.4 presents further structural
properties of customers’ optimal coverage policy, including monotonicity of thresholds in
time, for the case that the updating scheme is stationary. In section 3.5 we derive customers’
average warranty coverage duration and provider’s expected profits. Section 3.6 compares
the profitability of the monthly warranty and the traditional fixed duration warranty in a
heterogenous market through numerical examples. Section 3.7 concludes with a summary
of findings and opportunities for extending this work.
3.2 Literature Review
In the warranty literature, research has largely focused on base warranties, although inter-
est in extended warranties is now burgeoning as post-sales services are being recognized
as important to manufacturers’ revenue, margin and customer loyalty (see Cohen et al.
2006.) Among papers on extended warranties, several illustrate how heterogeneity among
customers can enable segmentation of the extended warranty market. For example, Pad-
manabhan and Rao (1993) consider pricing strategies in the presence of heterogeneous
risk preferences and consumer moral hazard. Lutz and Padmanabhan (1994) consider in-
come variation among customers, whereas Lutz and Padmanabhan (1998) examine how
customers’ differing utility of a functioning product enables market segmentation. Other
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papers discuss customer usage heterogeneity in the context of warranty pricing, including
Padmanabhan (1995), Hollis (1999) and Moskowitz and Chun (1994).
The extended warranty literature contains almost no prior research on extended war-
ranties with flexible duration. The sole exceptions to our knowledge are papers by Jack
and Murthy (2007) and Wang et al. (2010). Jack and Murthy (2007) study the pricing of
flexible extended warranties in a Stackelberg game setting, with the manufacturer as the
leader and the customer as the follower. The manufacturer sets the price per unit time of
the extended warranty and the customer chooses the start time for the extended warranty
and replacement time for the product. Wang et al. (2010) study flexible extended warranties
and model the customer’s optimal dynamic choice in how to respond to a failure. The cus-
tomer’s ability to choose between repair and replacement upon failure is one of the factors
that impedes fixed-term extended warranty sales for inexpensive products, particularly in
markets where technology is improving rapidly, and is part of what makes flexibility in
warranty duration attractive.
Flexible warranties can be viewed as a form of renewable warranty contract. Renewable
warranties have been studied by Lam and Lam (2001) and Hartman and Laksana (2009).
Lam and Lam (2001) consider an extended warranty model that includes a free repair pe-
riod and an optional extended warranty period. Consumers choose whether to purchase
the extended warranty at the end of the free repair period. They use renewal theory to
derive customers’ optimal policies under different conditions, and an ε-optimal policy for
the provider. Hartman and Laksana (2009) consider the design and pricing of menus of
renewable extended warranty contracts. Like Jack and Murthy (2007), their paper presents
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a Stackelberg game in which a customer makes warranty renewal and product replacement
decisions as the best response to the provider’s service terms and pricing.
This chapter explores advantages of flexibility duration in support services. Unlike
the previous work related to flexible warranties, it models customers’ dynamic updating
of product failure probability estimates over time, based on failure observations. In this
setting, a monthly warranty premium can be thought of as an option value embedded in the
monthly warranty that enables customers to learn the reliability of the product over time
without committing to buy a costly long-term warranty. A second contribution over prior
art is the incorporation of uncertainty in customers’ product replacement timing, which
assumed to be exogenously driven. Replacement timing may be exogenously determined
when market developments such as technology breakthroughs or dramatic price drops make
product replacement attractive. The uncertain timing of such events is consistent with the
assumption of uncertain replacement time. However, the model in this chapter strikes a
compromise between the dynamic replacement decisions based on failure status in Wang
et al. (2010) and Lam and Lam (2001) and the failure-independent replacement time in
Jack and Murthy (2007) and Hartman and Laksana (2009) by making the probability of
replacement for any given product age dependent on the failure status of the product. This
feature of the model accommodates the realistic scenario that a customer is more likely to
replace a failed product than a functional product.
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3.3 The Customer’s Problem
In this section, we study a flexible-duration extended warranty with month-by-month com-
mitments and monthly premium m. The warranty provider imposes two restrictions on ex-
tended warranty purchase: (1) if the customer purchases coverage, it must be started before
the product reaches a pre-specified age, and (2) the extended warranty cannot be resumed
once it is discontinued. These restrictions are consistent with the practice of most warranty
providers, who require extended coverage to begin when the product is still under the base
warranty, and renewals to occur while the extended warranty is in effect. Such restrictions
are appropriate for a provider who finds it technically infeasible or cost-prohibitive to ver-
ify that a customer’s product is functional before allowing extended coverage. To simplify
the exposition of the paper, we further assume that extended coverage must begin at the
beginning of the planning horizon. This assumption is not restrictive, since one can simply
assume that the customer’s planning horizon in this model begins at the end of the base
warranty.
The customer may be uncertain about how long he will own the base product. This
uncertainty may come from several sources. He may be unsure how much he will like the
product, or how soon a better product will be available on the market that induces him to
upgrade. The randomness in his holding horizon depends also on the product reliability
since customers are more likely to replace a failed product than a functional one. We ex-
press uncertainty in the length of the customer’s holding horizon as follows. Let qi(t) be
the month-t termination probability where i ∈ {0,1} denotes the state with i = 0 represent-
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ing a failure and i = 1 representing a functioning product. More specifically, q0(t) (resp.,
q1(t)) is the probability that the customer will abandon the product at the end of month t,
given that he has not replaced it prior to that month and that the product fails (resp., does
not fail) in that month. A special case is the fixed time horizon T +1 model as qi(t) = 0 for
t = 1,2, . . . ,T , i= 0,1 and qi(T +1) = 1 for i= 0,1. Notice that this formulation essentially
allows a random horizon that is bounded above by T +1.
We assume that at most one failure can occur in each month. Let It be a failure in-
dicator random variable, taking value 1 if there is a failure in month t and taking value 0
otherwise. For notational convenience, let It = {I1, I2, . . . , It} denote the failure history in
months 1,2, . . . , t and I0 is the prior belief about the failure process. In each month, the cus-
tomer updates his estimate of the product failure probability based on the product’s prior
failure history. Let pt+1(It) represent the estimated failure probability at the beginning of
month t +1 for failure history It . We make some assumptions about the failure probability
updating scheme pt+1(It).
Assumption 3.1. The failure probability update process is Markovian.
More precisely, the probability update depends only on the present state, i.e., pt+1(It) =
Ht+1(pt , It), where Ht+1 is an updating function. We define p+t+1 = Ht+1(pt , It = 1) and
p−t+1 = Ht+1(pt , It = 0). The quantity p
+
t+1 (resp., p−t+1) represents the failure probability
estimate at the beginning of month t +1 when the month t failure probability estimate was
pt and a failure occurred (resp., did not occur) in month t.
Assumption 3.2. The failure probability updating method satisfies:
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(a) Ht+1(pt ,1)≥ Ht+1(pt ,0) for any t and 0 ≤ pt ≤ 1;
(b) Ht+1(pt , It) is increasing in pt for all t and It ∈ {0,1}.
Throughout this chapter we use “increasing” to signify “non-decreasing,” and “decreas-
ing” to signify “non-increasing.” Assumption 3.2(a) is equivalent to p+t+1 ≥ p−t+1 and it says
that the estimated failure probability is higher if a failure occurs in the current month. As-
sumption 3.2(b) is equivalent to the condition p+t+1 ≥ p′+t+1 and p−t+1 ≥ p′−t+1 for any pt ≥ p′t ,
and it says that the estimated failure probability in a given month is increasing in the pre-
vious month’s failure probability estimate. Note that the updating scheme Ht(·, ·) need not
assume stationarity in the failure probabilities and Ht(·, ·) may be different from Hs(·, ·) for
t 6= s.
Customer risk aversion is a common justification in the insurance industry, where losses
are large enough to impose some curvature on the utility function. However, the magnitude
of losses from failures of many consumer products is smaller than what would be required
to produce curvature on most customers’ utility curve. In addition, warranties are different
from insurance in that the provider does not need to charge a risk-premium to make a
profit. This is particularly true in warranties when the warranty provider has economies
of scale in repairing products. For these reasons, we study an environment where the
customer is risk neutral, and focus on other reasons for buying and selling warranties, such
as information asymmetry in product failure probabilities and scale economies in providing
repair services.
We consider a customer who has just purchased a new product, and would like to min-
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imize his total expected cost of supporting the product over a random planning horizon
bounded by T + 1. He must choose whether to begin coverage in the first month and
whether to continue coverage for his product in each month thereafter. When the coverage
is discontinued or the product is abandoned, there are no further decisions to be made for
the product in the future. The customer decides whether to continue coverage based on his
estimate of the product failure probability. If a failure occurs, repairs occur immediately
at the end of the same month. The repair cost to the customer of an uncovered failure in
month t is a random variable Ct . We assume that c = ECt is independent of t and is known
to the customer and the warranty provider. Under Assumption 3.1, the total expected cost
from t to the end of the horizon depends on the current estimated failure probability and
is independent of the failure process realization before this month. Let Rt(pt) be the cus-
tomer’s minimum total expected cost during {t, t +1, . . . ,T +1}, given that his estimated
failure probability at the beginning of month t is pt and that he doesn’t buy coverage in this
month.
Then, the customer’s total expected cost of terminating coverage at state (t, pt), t =
1,2, . . . ,T, is
Rt(pt) = pt(1−q0(t))(c+Rt+1(p+t+1))+(1− pt)(1−q1(t))Rt+1(p−t+1). (3.1)
We assume that customers don’t need to repair failed products after the planning horizon
ends, so the boundary conditions are RT+1(·) = 0. Under some mild conditions, equation
(3.1) can be simplified as follows.
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Lemma 3.1. If q0(t) = q1(t), denoted by q(t), for t = 1,2, . . . ,T , and the updating scheme
is a martingale with respect to the failure process, i.e., E[pt+1|It] = pt , then Rt(pt) =
ptc∑Ti=t ∏ij=t(1−q( j)).
All the proofs in this chapter are provided in Appendix A. Common updating schemes
such as the Beta updating scheme and the exponential smoothing mechanism result in mar-
tingales that satisfy Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2. In the special case where the updating scheme
is a martingale and q0(t) = q1(t) = 0 for t = 1,2, . . . ,T , Rt(pt) = (T +1− t)ptc.
Let Bt(pt) be the customer’s minimum total expected cost during {t, t +1, . . . ,T +1},
given that his estimated failure probability at the beginning of month t is pt and that he
buys coverage for month t. Let Wt(pt) be the customer’s minimum total expected cost
during {t, t+1, . . . ,T +1}, given that he had warranty coverage in month t−1 and that his
estimated failure probability at the beginning of month t is pt . The customer’s minimum
total expected cost of continuing warranty coverage is given by:
Bt(pt) = m+ pt(1−q0(t))Wt+1(p+t+1)+(1− pt)(1−q1(t))Wt+1(p−t+1). (3.2)
The optimal decision is the action with the smaller expected cost, so
Wt(pt) = min{Bt(pt), Rt(pt)} , (3.3)
with boundary conditions WT+1(·) = 0. For t > 1, equation (3.3) reflects the customer’s
choice in each month between continuing warranty coverage and incurring total expected
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cost Bt(pt) or terminating coverage and incurring expected support costs Rt(pt) over the
remainder of the horizon. For t = 1, equation (3.3) corresponds to the customer’s choice of
whether or not to start coverage.
Without loss of generality, we assume that q0(T )c ≥ m; otherwise the customer never
buys coverage in month T . The quantity Rt(pt)−Bt(pt) is the total benefit of continuing
the monthly warranty in month t, given that the estimated failure probability is pt .
Proposition 3.1. Under Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2, if q0(t) is increasing in t, then Rt(pt)−
Bt(pt) is increasing in pt for t = 1,2, . . . ,T. Moreover, Rt(pt)−Bt(pt) ≤ (1−q0(t))c−mq0(t) if
q0(t)> 0.
Proposition 3.1 says that the total benefit of continuing the monthly warranty is increas-
ing in the estimated failure probability pt and it is bounded above. We can now show that
the optimal policy has a threshold structure:
Theorem 3.1 (THRESHOLD POLICY). (a) If the customer was covered in the previous
month, it is optimal to continue coverage in month t if and only if Rt(pt)−Bt(pt)≥ 0.
(He is indifferent between buying coverage and stopping coverage when the inequality
becomes an equality.)
(b) Under Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2, if q0(t) is increasing in t, then there exists a sequence
of failure probability estimate thresholds {p∗t : t = 1, . . . ,T} such that it is optimal to
continue coverage in month t if and only if the estimated failure probability pt ≥ p∗t .
Moreover, p∗t ≤ m(1−q0(t))c .
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The optimal thresholds are independent of the failure realization, so they can be pre-
computed. We will now compare the optimal thresholds under this restricted monthly war-
ranty with a relaxed monthly warranty, where the customer is allowed to begin coverage at
any time in the product’s life and can resume coverage after discontinuing it.
For a relaxed monthly warranty, it is optimal to buy coverage in month t if and only
if pt ≥ m(1−q0(t))c . A customer of the more restrictive monthly warranty who bought cov-
erage in the previous month is more likely to buy coverage in the current month than a
customer of the unrestricted monthly warranty, since the thresholds p∗t ≤ m(1−q0(t))c for all t.
Consequently, imposing the restriction on restarting the monthly warranty may increase the
number of consecutive months that the customer buys coverage beginning at t = 1, because
cancelling the warranty means giving up the option of future coverage. Moreover, as dis-
cussed before, the restriction may be necessary in practice because warranty providers may
find it technically difficult or cost-prohibitive to verify that a customer’s product is func-
tional before allowing coverage to be purchased or extended. In the rest of this chapter,
monthly warranty refers to the restricted monthly warranty unless stated.
The following proposition discusses the monotonicity of total expected cost and thresh-
olds with respect to the monthly premium and repair cost.
Proposition 3.2. The optimal thresholds p∗t are increasing (resp., decreasing) in m (resp.,
c) for all t = 1,2, . . . ,T.
Proposition 3.2 says that the more expensive the monthly warranty the less likely the
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customer will be to buy it and that the more expensive the repair cost to the customer the
more likely the customer will be to buy the monthly warranty.
Proposition 3.3 indicates that the threshold policy holds under conditions beyond those
specified in Theorem 3.1(b).
Proposition 3.3 (THRESHOLD POLICY). Under Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2, if q0(t)≤ q1(t)
for t = 1,2, . . . ,T −1, the customer’s optimal coverage policy also has a threshold struc-
ture: there exists a p∗t in month t such that it is optimal to continue coverage in month t if
and only pt ≥ p∗t .
In particular, if there is no difference between the termination probabilities for func-
tional and failed products, i.e., q0(t) = q1(t) for t = 1,2, . . . ,T − 1, the optimal policy
always has a threshold structure under Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2. However, the condition
q0(t) ≤ q1(t) for t = 1,2, . . . ,T − 1 is not likely to hold in practice since customers are
generally more likely to replace a failed product than a functional one, i.e., q0(t)> q1(t).
Moreover, the optimal policy does not have a threshold structure for general termination
probabilities. The following is an example, although somewhat contrived, for which the
optimal policy does not have a threshold structure.
Example 3.1. Consider a three month problem (T = 2). Suppose the updating scheme
is pt+1(It) = pt and thus the estimated probability in the next month is the same as in
the previous month no matter what happens. Apparently, the updating scheme satisfies
Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2. Assume q0(1)= 100% and q1(1)= q0(2)= q1(2)= 0%, meaning
that customer replaces the product if it fails in month 1; otherwise the customer keeps it
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until the end of the horizon. Note that the termination probabilities violate the conditions
q0(1) ≤ q0(2) and q0(t)≤ q1(t) for t = 1. Let c = $100 and m = $5 Then, R2(p) = 100p
and W2(p) = min(5,100p), so it is optimal to buy coverage in month 2 if and only if p ≥
5%. According to equations (3.1) and (3.3), the expected cost of not buying coverage in
month 1 is R1(p) = (1− p)R2(p) = 100p(1− p) and the expected cost of buying coverage
in month 1 is 5+ (1− p)W2(p). It is optimal to buy coverage in month 1 if and only if
5+(1− p)W2(p)≤ 100p(1− p). Consequently, it is optimal to forgo coverage in month 1
if p < 5%. For p≥ 5%, it is optimal to buy coverage in month 1 if and only if 5+5(1− p)≤
100p(1− p), which is equivalent to 10.6% ≤ p ≤ 94.4%. So, the optimal policy in month
1 is to buy coverage if and only if 10.6% ≤ p ≤ 94.4%. This condition does not have a
simple threshold structure. The intuition is that for very low failure probability estimates,
the customer will not buy coverage because he is unlikely to experience a failure, whereas
for very high failure probability estimates, he will not buy coverage either because he is
very likely to abandon the product in period 1 due to failure, so his monthly premium would
be wasted. For more moderate failure probability estimates he will buy coverage.
In a more general formulation, the termination probabilities may be dependent on the
coverage status. For example, a customer may be more likely to abandon a failed product
if the product is not covered by a warranty. Under some conditions, the optimal policy also
has a threshold structure for this generalization. We leave the discussion of this case to
Appendix B.
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3.3.1 Beta Updating Scheme
As a specific example of the failure probability updating scheme, consider the special case
where the customer has a prior β(a,b) that he updates after each month as follows. Let
a1 = a and b1 = b. Given at and bt at the beginning of month t, then at+1 = at + It and
bt+1 = bt + (1− It). As a result, at the beginning of month t + 1 the expected failure
probability is pt+1 = at+1/(at+1 + bt+1). The expected failure probability in month t + 1
is p+t+1 = (at + 1)/(at + bt + 1) if a failure occurs in month t; p
−
t+1 = at/(at + bt + 1) if
no failure occurs in month t. Note that the Beta updating scheme is nonstationary. The
estimate pt(·) depends on t, and pt(·) is different from pt+1(·). It is easy to verify the
following:
Lemma 3.2. (a) The Beta updating scheme pt+1 = at+1/(at+1 + bt+1) satisfies Assump-
tions 3.1 and 3.2.
(b) The Beta updating scheme is a martingale.
All of the results in the last section hold for the Beta updating scheme. In particular,
we know from Theorem 3.1(b) that the customer’s optimal coverage policy has a threshold
structure. Let Nt be the total number of failures prior to month t. The following theorem
describes the thresholds in the context of the Beta updating scheme in terms of Nt .
Theorem 3.2 (OPTIMAL POLICY). If the optimal policy has a threshold structure with
thresholds p∗t , then there exist a sequence of thresholds {x∗t : t = 1,2, . . . ,T} for the Beta
updating scheme such that it is optimal for the customer to continue coverage in month t if
and only if Nt ≥ x∗t .
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The following is an example that illustrates the customer’s optimal claim policy with
threshold structure under dynamic reliability learning and uncertainty in the product re-
placement time. The customer dynamically applies an optimal coverage policy to minimize
his total expected cost, based on the failure observations, using the Beta updating scheme
to update the failure probabilities.
Example 3.2. We consider a finite horizon problem with T = 12 months. The customer has
a Beta prior on the failure probability with a = 2 and b = 100, so his initial estimate of the
failure probability is a/(a+ b) = 1.96%. He updates the failure probability according to
the Beta updating scheme described above. The expected repair cost to the customer is c =
$100. We assume that the early termination probabilities are as follows: q0(t) = q1(t) = 0
for t = 1,2, . . . ,6 and q0(t) = 10%, q1(t) = 5% for t = 7,8, . . . ,12.
Table 3.1: Optimal Thresholds and Average Purchase Durations
premium m avg duration optimal thresholds x∗t , t = 1,2, . . . ,12.
$ 1.90 6.60 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
$ 2.00 3.49 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table 3.1 summarizes the customer’s optimal thresholds x∗t with respect to monthly
premia m ∈ {$1.90,$2.00}. Recall that x∗t represents the minimum number of failures
prior to month t that the customer needs to have observed so that continuing coverage
in month t is optimal. For example, x∗5 = 1 indicates that he will continue coverage in
month 5 if he bought coverage in the previous month and at least one failure occurred
prior to month 5. Observe from Table 3.1 that x∗1 = 0 for both monthly premia considered,
and so the customer will buy coverage in the first month for m ∈ {$1.90,$2.00}, including
premium m= $2.00 that exceeds the customer’s prior expected repair cost in the first month
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c ·a/(a+b) = $1.96. From the recursion (3.1), the expected support cost without coverage
is $21.08. Note that if a traditional 12-month warranty were offered at price 12m instead
of the monthly warranty, the customer would not buy it for the traditional warranty prices
r ∈ {$22.80,$24.00}, corresponding to the monthly premia m ∈ {$1.90,$2.00}, and yet
he would buy at least a few months of coverage under the comparably-priced monthly
warranty. The customer’s expected coverage duration, obtained under the assumption that
the true failure probability is 2.00% using recursions to be discussed in section 3.5, is 3.49
months for m = $2.00.
This example illustrates the embedded option value of the duration flexibility in the
context of reliability learning and early termination. Customers are willing to pay a pre-
mium for the monthly warranty relative to a conventional, fixed-term warranty in order to
retain the ability to buy coverage in the future while learning the reliability of the product,
without committing to long-term warranty coverage.
3.4 Stationary Updating Schemes
In this section, we consider the case that the failure updating scheme is stationary, i.e., time
independent, and derive further properties of the thresholds under this assumption.
Assumption 3.3. The failure probability updating scheme is stationary.
Under Assumptions 3.1 and 3.3, pt+1(It) = H(pt , It). Before considering the mono-
tonicity of the thresholds, we present some properties of the cost function Wt(p) and Rt(p)
with respect to t.
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Proposition 3.4. Under Assumptions 3.1-3.3, if both q0(t) and q1(t) are increasing in t,
then
(a) Rt(p), Bt(p) and Wt(p) are decreasing in t for 0 ≤ p ≤ 1.
(b) Rt(p)−Bt(p) is decreasing in t for 0 ≤ p ≤ 1.
Proposition 3.4 says that the benefit of buying the coverage, which corresponds to
Rt(p)−Bt(p), is lower close to the end of the horizon. Theorem 3.3 shows that the thresh-
olds are increasing in time t.
Theorem 3.3 (MONOTONICITY OF THRESHOLDS). Under Assumptions 3.1-3.3, if both
q0(t) and q1(t) are increasing in t, then the thresholds in the customer’s optimal coverage
policy are increasing in t, i.e., p∗1 ≤ p∗2 ≤ . . .≤ p∗T = m(1−q0(T ))c .
In other words, the customer’s likelihood of continuing monthly warranty coverage
decreases as the end of the horizon gets closer. Although the thresholds are increasing,
each month’s threshold can be bounded above by the estimated failure probability based on
the threshold in the previous month. Let p∗+t+1 be the updated failure probability in month
t +1 if a failure occurs in month t given that the estimated failure probability is p∗t at the
beginning of month t.
Proposition 3.5. Under Assumptions 3.1-3.3, if q0(t) is constant, q1(t) is increasing in t
and p+t+1 ≥ pt for all 0 ≤ pt ≤ 1, then p∗t+1 ≤ p∗+t+1.
Proposition 3.5 tells us that if it is optimal for a customer to buy coverage in month t,
and a failure occurs in month t, then it will be optimal for him to buy coverage in month
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t+1 as well, because his updated failure probability estimate will exceed the threshold p∗t+1
in month t + 1. This suggests that the customer would keep the warranty after a covered
failure unless the failure occurs during the last month T in the horizon.
3.4.1 Exponential Smoothing Mechanism
An example of a stationary failure probability updating scheme is the exponential smooth-
ing mechanism. Assume that the prior failure probability estimate is p1 and the customer
updates it as follows:
pt+1 = pt +α(It − pt) for t = 1,2, . . . ,T −1, (3.4)
where α is constant and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. The parameter α reflects the degree of inertia in the
failure probability estimate; lower values of α correspond to more weight on the previous
failure probability estimates. The probability estimate in the next month only depends
on the current probability estimate and the failure observation in the current month. The
customer compares the failure observation with the estimated failure probability and makes
a linear adjustment, so the exponential smoothing mechanism can also be called a linear
adjustment scheme. Then p+t+1 = (1−α)pt +α if a failure occurs in month t; p−t+1 =
(1−α)pt otherwise. Expanding the recursion (3.4) yields ,






In the Beta updating scheme, the estimate of the failure probability in the next month
depends on the number of observed failures up to the current month, and all failures have
the same weight regardless of recency. In the exponential smoothing mechanism, the more
recent failures weigh more.
Lemma 3.3. (a) The exponential smoothing mechanism satisfies Assumptions 3.1-3.3.
(b) The exponential smoothing mechanism is a martingale.
Thus, all the results for general and stationary updating schemes hold for the expo-
nential smoothing mechanism. As discussed before, if q0(t) = q1(t) = 0 for t = 1,2, . . . ,T ,
then Rt(pt) = (T +1− t)ptc from Lemma 3.1 and it is independent of the adjustment factor
α.
The following proposition demonstrates additional structural results for the customer’s
coverage decision process under the exponential smoothing mechanism.
Proposition 3.6. For the exponential smoothing mechanism, if q0(t) = q1(t), denoted by
q(t), for t = 1,2, . . . ,T,
(a) Both Bt(pt) and Wt(pt) are increasing concave in pt for t = 1,2, . . . ,T.
(b) Both Bt(pt) and Wt(pt) are decreasing concave in α for 0≤ pt ≤ 1 and t = 1,2, . . . ,T.
(c) The thresholds p∗t are decreasing in α for t = 1,2, . . . ,T.
Proposition 3.6 says that the higher the adjustment factor, the more likely the customer
is to buy the monthly warranty in the first month, for any given prior probability esti-
mate. The following are some examples that illustrate the customer’s optimal claim policy
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Figure 3.1: Thresholds w.r.t Monthly Pre-
mium



















Figure 3.2: Thresholds w.r.t Adjustment De-
gree


















with threshold structure and demonstrate the monotonicity of the thresholds with respect
to monthly premium and time, assuming that the customer uses the exponential smoothing
mechanism to update the failure probabilities.
Example 3.3. We consider an example with time horizon T = 12 months and expected re-
pair cost to the customer c = $100. The customer’s prior estimate of the failure probability
is 2.50% and he updates the failure probability according to the exponential smoothing
mechanism described above. The product replacement time is assumed deterministic and
equal to T +1, so the termination probabilities are q0(t) = q1(t) = 0 for all t = 1,2, . . . ,T.
Note that they satisfy all the conditions on termination probabilities in all of the above
results.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the customer’s optimal thresholds p∗t , t = 1, . . . ,12 for the adjust-
ment factor α = 0.10 and the monthly premia m ∈ {$2.00,$3.00,$4.00}. From Theorem
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3.1, the customer will continue coverage in month t if and only if the estimated failure prob-
ability pt is greater or equal to the threshold p∗t . Observe from Figure 3.1 that the prior
failure probability p1 = 2.50% is greater than all the thresholds {1.01%,1.56%,2.14%}
in month 1 for all monthly premia considered, so the customer will buy coverage in the
first month for all m ∈ {$2.00,$3.00,$4.00}, including those premia values that exceed
the customer’s prior expected repair cost c · p1 = $2.50. Figure 3.1 demonstrates that the
thresholds are increasing in time t and the monthly premium, respectively. The threshold




t +α(1− p∗t ), which is the updated estimate of pt+1
based on p∗t and an observed failure in month t. For example, p∗5 = 1.86% for the monthly
premium m = $3.00. Also, p∗+6 = p∗5 +α(1− p∗5) = 11.67% > p∗6 = 1.96%. Assuming the
true failure probability is 2.00%, the average purchase durations are {6.68,4.62,2.40}
months for monthly premia m ∈ {$2.00,$3.00,$4.00}, respectively.
Figure 3.2 shows that the customer’s optimal threshold p∗t is increasing in month t but
is decreasing with respect to the adjustment degree α for any month t, where the monthly
warranty premium is m = $3.00.The three lines converge to p∗t = 3.00% at the end of
the horizon T = 12 since the optimal threshold in the last month is p∗12 = m/c = 3.00%,
independent of the adjustment factor α. At first glance, it may seem that the higher the
adjustment factor α, the longer the customer will keep coverage because the threshold is
decreasing in α from Proposition 3.6. However, in this example, the average purchase
duration is in fact decreasing in the adjustment factor: the average purchase durations
are {4.62,3.43,3.31} months for adjustment degrees α ∈ {0.10,0.20,0.30}, respectively.
Because the true failure probability is very low (2.00% in this example), it is very unlikely
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that a failure occurs in a given month, and the estimated probability in the next month
decreases more quickly for higher adjustment degree from equation (3.4). The rate of
decrease in the failure probability estimate may exceed the rate of increase in the threshold,
so customers with higher adjustment factor may terminate coverage earlier.
3.5 The Provider’s Problem
In this section we will study the provider’s profits from the customer’s optimal coverage
for the restricted monthly warranty under reliability learning and random replacement time.
We show how to compute the provider’s expected profit and the customer’s expected cov-
erage duration.
Let βC be the repair cost to the provider for a failure with cost C to the customer, where
β is constant and 0≤ β≤ 1. Denote termination probabilities from month t to the end of the
horizon as Qt :=
{
(q0(i),q1(i)) : i = t, t+1, . . . ,T
}
. Let pit(pt ,m,Qt) and Dt(pt ,m,Qt) be
the total expected profit to the provider and the customer’s total expected purchase duration,
respectively, from month t to the end of the horizon, given that the customer’s estimated
failure probability at the beginning of month t is pt , the monthly premium is m and the
termination probabilities are Qt . The recursive equations for pit(pt ,m,Qt) and Dt(pt ,m,Qt)
can be formulated as follows:
If Rt(pt)−Bt(pt) ≥ 0, which can be implied by pt ≥ p∗t from Theorem 3.1, then the
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customer continues buying the monthly warranty in month t:





Dt(pt ,m,Qt) = 1+λ(1−q0(t))Dt+1(p+t+1,m,Qt+1)+(1−λ)(1−q1(t))Dt+1(p−t+1,m,Qt+1).
If Rt(pt)−Bt(pt)< 0, which can be implied by pt < p∗t , then the customer stops buying
the monthly warranty in month t:
pit(pt ,m,Qt) = 0,
Dt(pt ,m,Qt) = 0.
The boundary conditions are piT+1(·, ·, ·) = 0 and DT+1(·, ·, ·) = 0. Then, the total profit
from a customer is pi1(p1,m,Q1) and the total purchase duration is D1(p1,m,Q1), where
p1 is the prior failure probability estimate and Q1 represents the termination probabilities
from month 1 to the end of the horizon. In a homogeneous market, the problem faced by




Denote by m∗= argmaxm≥0 pi1(p1,m,Q1) the optimal monthly premium; then pi1(p1,m∗,Q1)
is the optimal profit.
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We now compare monthly warranty profits to those from a traditional, fixed-duration
warranty. Consider a traditional warranty of duration T months and let St(Qt) be the total
expected traditional warranty support cost to the provider for a customer from month t to
the end of the horizon, given that the customer’s termination probabilities are Qt . The
recursive equations for St are:
St(Qt) = λ(1−q0(t))(βc+St+1(Qt+1))+(1−λ)(1−q1(t))St+1(Qt+1),
with boundary condition ST+1(·) = 0. In a market where only a traditional warranty or pay-
as-you-go repair service are available and all the customers are homogeneous, a customer
buys the traditional warranty if and only if its price r is not greater than the expected cost of
not purchasing warranty R1(p1), which can be found by solving recursive equations (3.1)
with termination probabilities Q1. The problem faced by the traditional warranty provider





where pit(p1,r,Q1) = (r−S1(Q1))1(r ≤ R1(p1)) and the indicator function 1(z) = 1 if z is
true; 1(z) = 0 otherwise. Denote by r∗ = argmaxr≥0 pit(p1,r,Q1) the optimal price of the
traditional warranty; then pit(p1,r∗,Q1) is the optimal profit. We compare optimal profits
of the monthly warranty and the traditional warranty first in the context of a homogeneous
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market, where customers update the failure probabilities following the Beta or exponential
smoothing schemes. The following theorem holds in this setting.
Theorem 3.4. Under Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2, in a homogeneous market where cus-
tomers follow either the Beta updating scheme or the exponential smoothing mechanism
and q0(t) = q1(t) for t = 1,2, . . . ,T , the monthly warranty is strictly more profitable to the
provider than the traditional warranty if and only if the prior failure probability p1 satisfies
p1 < po1, where
po1 = inf{p1 ≥ 0 : pi1(p1,m∗,Q1)≤ R1(p1)−S1(Q1)} . (3.7)
In a homogeneous market where customers have a low prior failure probability estimate,
then the customer’s willingness to pay for the traditional warranty is low as well and the
traditional warranty may result in little or no profit, so the monthly warranty may be more
profitable. The following is an example that shows the comparison between the monthly
warranty and the traditional warranty.
Example 3.4. We revisit Example 3.3 and consider the warranty provider’s problem. The
customer updates the estimate of the failure probability according to the exponential smooth-
ing mechanism with adjustment factor α = 0.3. The repair cost to the provider is βc =
0.6 ·$100 = $60. Assume the true failure probability is 2.00%. Solving optimization prob-
lems (3.5) and (3.6) gives the optimal profits for the warranty provider from the traditional
warranty and the monthly warranty, respectively.
Figure 3.3 illustrates the profit comparison between the monthly warranty and the tra-
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Figure 3.3: Comparison between Warranties in a Homogeneous Market

























profit of monthly warranty
profit of traditional warranty
ditional warranty. Their profits are both increasing with respect to the prior estimate of the
failure probability. When the prior failure probability is lower than 1.25%, the traditional
warranty is unprofitable to the provider. In contrast, the monthly warranty always results
in profit from each customer and the profit is nontrivial even for very low prior failure
probability. In this example, p01 = 1.875%, i.e., if the prior failure probability is less than
1.875%, the monthly warranty is strictly more profitable to the provider.
Next, we discuss the case of a heterogeneous market and illustrate the profitability
through numerical examples. Suppose that there are N market segments in a heteroge-





1 (i) : i = 1,2, . . . ,T
}
and proportion γn. The total market
size is normalized to be 1, i.e., ∑Nn=1 γn = 1. The expected profit to the provider from market




1 ). The provider’s problem is to choose the monthly premium
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In a market where only a traditional warranty or pay-as-you-go repair service are avail-
able, a customer of market segment n buys the traditional warranty if and only if its price
r is not greater than the cost of not purchasing warranty R(n)1 (p
(n)
1 ), which can be found
by solving recursive equation (3.1) with termination probabilities Q(n)1 . The problem faced








γn(r−S(n)1 )1(r ≤ R(n)1 (p(n)1 ))
}
. (3.9)
If the provider offers a traditional warranty with a unified price to all market segments,
the customers with low priors may not buy coverage. A monthly warranty offers an op-
portunity to all customers to obtain coverage while learning about the product reliability
at a reasonable price, and thus may appeal to a broader market and earn more profit for
the provider. When the provider offers a menu of services consisting of a monthly war-
ranty and a traditional warranty, the customer will select the one with the lower cost, so the
problem is to find the monthly warranty premium m and the traditional warranty price r to
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where W (n)1 (p
(n)
1 ) is the minimum cost of the monthly warranty to a customer in market
segment n and can be found by solving recursive equations (3.1)-(3.3).
The comparison among profitability of the monthly warranty, the traditional warranty
and the warranty menu will be shown through some numerical examples in Section 3.6.
3.6 Numerical Examples
In this section, we present the results of some numerical studies that illustrate the cus-
tomer’s optimal claim policy and the warranty provider’s profit. The customer dynami-
cally applies optimal coverage and maintenance policy to minimize his expected cost, as
described in Section 3.3, based on the failure observations and failure probability updat-
ing scheme. In the following examples, we assume that customers use the Beta updating
scheme to update the failure probabilities.
3.6.1 Single Warranty
In this example, we consider a heterogeneous market consisting of two market segments,
customer types L and H, with different prior failure probabilities and different termination
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probabilities. The time horizon is T = 12 and the expected repair cost is c = $100 for
customers and βc = 0.6c = $60 for the provider. Customers of type L have termination
probabilities qL0(t) for products that fail in month t and qL1(t) for products that do not.
The H-type customers upgrade hardware more frequently as indicated through their higher
termination probabilities qH0 (t) and qH1 (t). The termination probabilities of both customer
types are shown in Table 3.2. Customers of type L and H have Beta-distributed priors
on the failure probability with aL = 4,bL = 200 and aH = 5,bH = 200, so the type-H
customers have a higher initial estimate of the failure probability (2.43%) than the type-
L customers (1.96%). Both types of customers update their failure probabilities using the
Beta updating scheme. For the purposes of computing the provider’s profits and average
coverage duration, we assume that the true failure probability in each month is λ = 2.00%.
Table 3.2: Termination Probabilities
month 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
qL1(t) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5%
qL0(t) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15%
qH1 (t) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25%
qH0 (t) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 35% 35% 35% 35% 35% 35%
We consider the cases that the provider offers either a monthly warranty or a traditional,
fixed-duration 12-month warranty. We compute the customer’s optimal decisions using
the dynamic programming recursions (3.1)-(3.3) and maximize the warranty provider’s
total expected profit solving the nonlinear programming problems (3.8)-(3.10). Table 3.3
summarizes the findings with respect to the proportion of L-type customers in the market.
It includes the optimal price, the average coverage duration for each customer type, and
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Table 3.3: Monthly Warranty vs Traditional Warranty w.r.t. Proportion of L-type Cus-
tomers
L proportion 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
monthly price $ 2.35 $ 2.35 $ 2.35 $ 1.90 $ 1.90 $ 1.90 $ 1.90 $ 1.90 $ 1.90
monthly profit $ 6.21 $ 5.52 $ 4.83 $ 4.38 $ 4.42 $ 4.46 $ 4.50 $ 4.54 $ 4.58
L avg duration 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.60 6.60 6.60 6.60 6.60 6.60
H avg duration 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.02 6.02 6.02 6.02 6.02 6.02
traditional price $ 20.50 $ 20.50 $ 20.50 $ 20.50 $ 20.50 $ 20.50 $ 20.50 $ 20.50 $ 20.50
traditional profit $0.79 $1.58 $2.38 $3.17 $3.96 $4.75 $5.55 $6.34 $7.13
L avg duration 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00
H avg duration 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
the expected provider profits for each case. If the provider offers a traditional warranty
alone, the optimal price is $20.50 and only the L-type customers buy it. The optimal profit
of the traditional warranty is $3.17 if the proportion of L-type customers is 40%. If the
provider instead offers only a monthly warranty, then the optimal monthly premium is
either $2.35 or $1.90 depending on the proportion of L-type customers. For example, if
L-type customers constitute 40% of the population, then the optimal monthly premium is
$1.90. The L-type customers will buy it for 6.60 months, and the H-type customers will
buy it for 6.02 months, on average. In this case, the optimal profit of the monthly warranty
is $4.38, which is 38.1% higher than the profit from the optimal traditional warranty for
this case. Note that the customers’ optimal coverage policy follows a threshold structure in
this example since conditions of Theorem 3.1(b) are satisfied.
Figure 3.4 shows the provider’s profits from the monthly and traditional warranties as
a function of the proportion of L-type customers. Observe that as the proportion of L-type
customers increases, the total expected profit of the traditional warranty increases linearly
since the optimal price doesn’t change and it only captures L-type customers; the total
expected profit of the monthly roughly decreases since the monthly premium decreases
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in order to capture both market segments. The monthly warranty can attract a broader
range of market segments; it captures two market segments when the proportion of L-type
customers is larger than or equal to 40%. The monthly warranty is more profitable when
the proportion of L-type customers is less than 50% and and the traditional warranty is
more profitable when the L-type customer proportion is higher.
3.6.2 Warranty Menu
We revisit the above example and now consider the case in which the provider offers a
menu consisting of both a monthly warranty and a traditional warranty; customers choose
the warranty with the lowest expected support cost. Table 3.4 summarizes the results of the
optimal menu with respect to the proportion of L-type customers. The optimal prices are
constant: $2.35 for the monthly warranty and $20.50 for the traditional warranty. Figure
3.4 shows that the profit of the optimal combination is increasing linearly in the proportion
of L-type customers and is always higher than profits of either the monthly warranty or
the traditional warranty alone. For example, if L-type customers constitute 40% of the
population, the profit of this combination is $7.31, which is 67.02% higher than the profit
of offering the monthly warranty alone and 130.65% higher than offering the traditional
warranty alone.
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Figure 3.4: Comparison among Warranties in a Heterogenous Market


























profit of monthly warranty
profit of traditional warranty
profit of warranty menu
Table 3.4: Menu of Monthly & Traditional Warranties w.r.t. Proportion of L-type Cus-
tomers
L proportion 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
monthly price $ 2.35 $ 2.35 $ 2.35 $ 2.35 $ 2.35 $ 2.35 $ 2.35 $ 2.35 $ 2.35
traditional price $ 20.50 $ 20.50 $ 20.50 $ 20.50 $ 20.50 $ 20.50 $ 20.50 $ 20.50 $ 20.50
total profit $ 7.00 $ 7.10 $ 7.21 $ 7.31 $ 7.41 $ 7.51 $ 7.62 $ 7.72 $ 7.82
L avg duration 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00
H avg duration 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00
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3.7 Conclusion
As product margins decline in increasingly competitive hardware markets, EWs with high
margin and high revenue are becoming critical to manufacturers’ profitability. Beyond di-
rect profits, post-sale services are a critical lever for influencing customer loyalty, and in
commodity product businesses, service quality and variety are important competitive dif-
ferentiators. Through the sale of innovative and attractive post-sales services, a manufac-
turer can enable its customers to reduce product support cost, and can increase customers’
loyalty. Attractive warranty offerings can increase service attach rates and enhance prof-
itability.
In this chapter, we have demonstrated that a flexible-duration warranty is attractive to
a broader range of market segments and can significantly improve the provider’s profit
through market expansion to customers who upgrade frequently or drop the hardware ear-
lier. Moreover, unlike the traditional warranty that only captures customers whose prior
failure probability is high, a flexible warranty is also attractive to the customers with low
prior failure probability since it offers an opportunity to learn the true failure probability
and correct their estimation at a reasonable price while being covered under warranty.
Because a flexible EW offers many advantages, it may attract a broad range of cus-
tomers. But for a warranty provider who also sells traditional EWs with one or more
full-years of coverage, the introduction of a flexible EW will likely cannibalize some or
all of the demand for the traditional EW. Therefore, the flexible EW should be carefully
designed and priced to avoid eroding profits, and indeed to increase them.
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The numerical examples show that if the provider only offers one type of coverage –
either the traditional warranty or the monthly warranty – then depending on the market
conditions, the monthly warranty can capture more customers and earn more profit than
the traditional one. The numerical examples also show that if the provider can offer a menu
consisting of both traditional and monthly warranties, it is optimal to offer the traditional
warranty at a relatively higher price to customers who keep the hardware longer, and offer
the monthly warranty at a premium price to customers who will upgrade the hardware
sooner. The warranty menu can capture even larger market segments and earn higher profit.
The superiority of the warranty menu over the individual offerings is robust to the market
composition.
There are several ways in which this model for flexible warranties can be generalized.
First, this chapter considers a single product life cycle; it can be extended to a longer hori-
zon with multiple product life cycles. If one assumes that the customer has the same prior
estimate of failure probability for each replacement product, then the problem can be for-
mulated as a regenerative process in which product replacements constitute renewals. The
process between two consecutive replacement epochs follows the model in this chapter. In
a longer horizon model that includes product replacement, we can include the customer’s
costs and provider’s profits from product replacement in addition to the costs and profits of
warranty coverage and repairs. The additional profit from product replacement will make
the monthly warranty even more attractive from the provider’s perspective. A second gen-
eralization is the relaxation of the risk neutrality assumption. If customers are risk averse,
they would be willing to pay a premium over expected support costs to buy coverage. In a
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similar framework to the regenerative process, we can show that risk averse customers will
purchase the monthly warranty for a longer duration than risk neutral customers. The more
risk averse the customers, the longer they will purchase the warranty coverage. Finally, this
chapter considers a monopoly market in which the manufacturer is also the sole warranty
provider. Competition from other warranty providers is another future research direction.
Chapter 4
Extended Warranties with Residual
Values
4.1 Introduction
As product margins decline in increasingly competitive hardware markets, high-margin,
high-revenue aftermarket services such as extended warranties (EW) are becoming criti-
cal to manufacturers’ profitability (see Cohen et al. 2006). Beyond direct profits, post-sale
services are a critical lever for influencing customer loyalty, and in commodity product
businesses, service quality and variety are important competitive differentiators. Through
the sale of innovative and attractive post-sales services, a manufacturer can enable its cus-
tomers to extract more use from their products, and increase customers’ loyalty. It is far
easier to attach services to an existing satisfied customer base than to win new customers for
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hardware sales. Not surprisingly, improving service attach rates is a top strategic priority
to many original equipment manufacturers (OEMs).
OEMs face three important challenges to improve the sales of EW. The first is compe-
tition from its own sales channel. Channel partners usually sell their own or third-party ex-
tended service plans on OEM’s products, since they earn much higher margins on services
than on hardware (see Gallego et al. 2008). A second challenge is a perception among
some customers that EWs are not a good value (see a survey on ConsumerReports.org).
This perception may be due in part to the fact that most warranties are offered at a uniform
price regardless of usage. The price may be too high for low-usage customers, and less than
the support cost of some high-usage customers. This leads us to the third challenge, which
is how to price-discriminate customers based on expected support when it is not possible,
or it is too costly, to measure usage or to monitor the environment where the product is
used. For some products, such as PCs, usage is an elusive concept to define. For others
where natural definitions of usage exist, such as printers or storage products, there may be
obstacles to verifying usage. EWs with usage limits once offered for Hewlett-Packard’s
Edgeline printers have been discontinued because of challenges in usage verification.
To overcome these challenges, an OEM must design a compelling service offering that
differentiates its own EWs from competitors’ services, attracts customers from different
market segments and retains healthy profit margins. One way to achieve market segmen-
tation with a single EW product without having to verify usage is through a residual value
warranty (RVW). It is a finite-length EW in which customers may receive a partial refund
at expiration, in the form of cash or a credit towards future purchases, where the rebate
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size depends on the number of claims made against the warranty. Customers who are not
entitled to a refund are still covered by the warranty. Like auto insurance policies, this type
of EW rewards customers for having few or no claims.
The idea is to design the price and the refund schedule so that the service product is
attractive to a broader set of users and at the same time is more profitable to the warranty
provider. Low-usage customers will typically experience a lower net cost because they
make fewer claims on average and are therefore entitled to larger refunds. Through intrin-
sically equitable pricing, an RVW may attract a much broader range of customers than a
comparable warranty with no refunds, thereby capturing greater market share and greater
profits for the warranty provider – all through a single service product. Significantly, an
RVW achieves this market segmentation without any need to verify usage rates or condi-
tions.
A warranty provider offering RVWs may choose to make it incumbent upon the cus-
tomer to request the refund, if eligible, at the end of the warranty. This choice may have
a number of consequences. First, customers may forget or lose the paperwork needed to
claim refunds or they may not have the time to do so. While low redemption rates can ben-
efit the warranty provider in the short run, a customer who experiences difficulties claiming
a refund may decide against buying this service in the future, negatively affecting the life
time value of the customer. For this reason, we will assume that the warranty provider
will automatically credit the customer’s account with the appropriate refund at the end of
the warranty. This is consistent with current practices (e.g., Officemax, Staples and Dell)
of making it is easier for customers to obtain rebates. This also helps avoid the problem
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of modeling customers that are rational at the time of purchase but forgetful at the time
of claiming refunds, although mismatch between intent and execution is a common phe-
nomenon (see DellaVigna and Malmendier 2006).
The price and refund schedule of an RVW must be carefully designed if these benefits
are to be realized. One must consider the expected support costs to the manufacturer for a
customer who buys the RVW; this is in turn affected by the distribution of product usage
rates in the customer population, as well as the claim policy that may be induced by the
prospect of a refund. One must also account for the types of EWs offered by competitors
and how they are priced. It is also critical to understand how customers respond to attributes
of an EW (such as the price and residual values) when choosing which one to buy.
We have created an analytical framework for designing and pricing RVWs in compet-
itive markets that considers all of these factors. It is the first research to design and price
post-sales services by applying ideas and tools from stochastic optimal control theory and
revenue management. The framework consists of three main modeling elements. The first
element is a continuous-time optimal control model that studies how customers strategi-
cally decide whether or not to place a claim for a repair. For example, a customer may
decide to pay out of pocket for an inexpensive repair rather than losing the residual value.
For this model, we have characterized the customer’s optimal claim strategy. For the cases
of exponentially distributed and constant repair costs, we have obtained closed-form solu-
tions for the customer’s expected refund, net of self-defrayed repair costs. We have also
developed a very good approximation of the optimal net refund that is valid for all claim
distributions based on a constant threshold policy for claiming failures. The second element
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concerns the customer demand for the RVW product. The third element is a computational
engine to determine the optimal price and rebate structure of the RVW. Together, these
elements help us design service products with a winning combination of quality and price
attributes.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 describes the related litera-
ture. Section 4.3 defines the RVW and studies the optimal claim strategy used by a strategic
customer who holds such a warranty. Section 4.4 analyzes the provider’s expected costs to
support a strategic RVW customer. Section 4.5 studies design and pricing of RVWs based
on costs to the provider and evaluations from strategic customers with heterogeneous usage
in a setting where the customer willingness-to-pay is exactly known (section 4.5.1) or has
random noises among alternative choices (section 4.5.2). Section 4.6 makes conclusions
and points out future research directions. All proofs are provided in Appendix A.
4.2 Literature Review
There are multiple veins of research related to this work. One of these is the design and
pricing of warranties. In the warranty literature, research has largely been focused on
base warranties; research in extended warranties and in design/pricing thereof has been
quite limited. A few papers illustrate how heterogeneity among customers can enable seg-
mentation of the extended warranty market. For example, Padmanabhan and Rao (1993)
consider pricing strategies in the presence of heterogeneous risk preferences and consumer
moral hazard. Lutz and Padmanabhan (1994) consider income variation among customers,
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whereas Lutz and Padmanabhan (1998) examine how customers’ differing utility of a func-
tioning product enables market segmentation. Three papers discuss usage heterogeneity in
the context of warranty pricing. Padmanabhan (1995) shows how manufacturers can design
and price a menu of warranty options in the presence of consumer moral hazard and us-
age heterogeneity, and satisfy the warranty demands of various consumer segments. Hollis
(1999) examines consumer welfare in the extended warranty market when customers vary
in usage, but the manufacturer cannot verify usage (and so cannot use usage as part of its
warranty terms). Moskowitz and Chun (1994) study the design and pricing of a menu of
usage and time based warranties in the presence of usage variation among customers.
Our paper differs from the prior work in a number of important ways. First, with the
exception of Moskowitz and Chun (1994), the prior work takes a simplistic view of product
reliability: items either work or do not work. To model failures in a way that realistically
reflects support costs over the warranty period, one must allow for multiple failures over
time. Secondly, the prior work considers the sale of EWs in monopolistic markets. In
reality, customers have a choice to purchase a variety of post-base-warranty services from
other vendors, including retailers or distributors. Well-informed customers will make a
decision based on their expected usage, and the cost of alternative service agreements,
including the cost of paying for services as needed. Optimal design and pricing depends
critically having a realistic model of the effects of competition on customer demand.
A second related vein of research is in customer strategic claim behavior. The con-
cept of an RVW is related to the practice in the insurance industry of offering a discounted
premium for policyholders with good claim records. These programs are used in the au-
92
tomobile insurance market under various names, including “no claims bonus,” “no claims
discount,” “bonus-malus,” “experience rating” and “merit rating” systems. Several papers
have studied customer’s optimal claim strategies and expected costs under such systems,
e.g., Zacks and Levikson (2004) and Zaks (2008). We do not attempt to provide a compre-
hensive review of this research area here, but instead discuss a few selected papers and refer
the reader to Kliger and Levikson (2002) for a recent survey of this stream of research.
Von Lanzenauer (1974) considers a merit rating system in which policyholders are clas-
sified into multiple risk categories in each period of the finite insurance horizon. Each risk
category has its own premium, which may include a discount or surcharge applied to a
base premium. At the end of each period, customers move from one risk category into
another based on the number of claims they filed in the preceding period. In a given period,
a policyholder can experience one or more accidents, where the damage associated with
each accident is a random variable. The policyholder must decide whether to file a claim
for each such accident. The author presents a dynamic programming formulation of the
policyholder’s decision by dividing each period into subintervals in which at most one ac-
cident can occur. The author assumes accidents occur according to a homogeneous Poisson
process. The author shows, using first-order conditions, that the optimal claim threshold
(“critical claim size”) is the difference between minimum future costs of filing a claim and
not filing a claim for an accident (analogous to our Theorem 4.1). The author also considers
an interesting case in which the policyholder does not know the failure rate, and so he must
estimate it as he goes along.
De Pril (1979) is most related to our paper with regard to modeling of customers’ opti-
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mal claim behavior. He essentially examines the same problem as Von Lanzenauer (1974),
except in continuous time as we do. The author presents a differential equation governing
the policyholder’s mininum discounted expectation of all future costs given current risk lev-
els and time. He also considers the special case of exponentially distributed loss amounts
and shows how to find the optimal critical claim sizes in this case. Our work presents simi-
lar results to De Pril (1979) in a context of an RVW, in which the customer’s optimal claim
decision is somewhat different. For example, once a customer has made the most number
of claims with a positive refund against their warranty, they will claim every subsequent
failure because there is no advantage to doing otherwise. In the insurance context, there
is always some incentive to avoid making claims, since future premia are determined by
length of time since last claim.
Among papers in merit rating systems, Kliger and Levikson (2002) is the only one
to our knowledge that considers the interplay of the insurer and the insured in a game
theoretic framework. The authors consider a special case of the merit rating system in
which a policyholder receives a discount on future annual premia if they file no claims for
certain years. The authors give the optimal decisions of both the insured and the insurer in
this framework, using Markov decision processes and game theory. The paper differs from
ours in that their model does not include heterogeneity among users, nor any competition
in the market. Furthermore, the customer does not have any reservation value to make a
policy incentive-compatible to customers.
Strategic purchase behavior of consumers, a third related area of research, has been
widely studied in the context of operations management, e.g., Su (2007), Su and Zhang
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(2008), Cachon and Swinney (2009) and Lai et al. (2009). Our paper focuses on the cus-
tomers’ strategic post-purchase behavior during the warranty coverage and how the service
provider should design and price RVW being aware of such strategic behavior. Consumer
rebates play an important role in sales promotion (see Chen et al. 2005, Lu and Moorthy
2007, Soman 1998). Patankar and Mitra (1995) investigate the effect of warranty execution
on the expected warranty reserves of a linear prorata rebate plan, where consumer behavior
is influenced by rebate plan, warranty time, warranty attrition, etc. In Chen et al. (2005),
rebates can achieve price discrimination within a customer among her postpurchase state,
but only customers with high marginal utility redeem the rebates because redemption in-
curs a cost, while in our paper automatic rebate credit without any redemption effort not
only achieves market segmentation but also makes the service products more attractive.
4.3 The Model
We consider an RVW where customers may receive a rebate at the end of the warranty
period. The size of the refund depends on the number of claims made during the warranty
period. The warranty’s coverage period is of length T . We will measure times backwards
with t being the time-to-go until the end of the warranty, and assume that failures arrive
according to a non-homogeneous Poisson process with instantaneous rate λut where u is the
usage rate. A failure at time t has random repair cost Ct with known cumulative distribution
Ft(·) (tail distribution ¯Ft(·)). For ease of notation we will develop formulas suppressing
usage and will introduce heterogenous customers with different usage rates once the basic
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λsds, t ≥ 0.
We will use the terms increasing and decreasing in the weak sense unless stated otherwise.
We assume that there is a refund schedule 0≤ r0 ≤ r1 ≤ . . .≤ rn for some non-negative
integer n. For convenience we will define r j = 0 for all integers j < 0. A customer who
makes 0 ≤ j ≤ n claims over the warranty period will receive a positive refund rn− j. A
customer who makes more than n claims will not receive a refund but still be covered
under the warranty for failures. A customer pays an out-of-pocket cost Ct at time t (costs
are assumed to be time-invariant if we drop the subscript t), if he or she decides not to claim
the failure with the service provider. We will assume throughout that the refund schedule
is increasing convex and by this we mean that the increments ∆r j := r j − r j−1 are non-
decreasing. Notice that the RVW can be implemented by giving customers n+1 coupons
with values ∆r j, j = 0,1, . . . ,n. To file a claim customer must surrender the outstanding
coupon with the largest value. An important special case is ∆r j = αEC is a constant for
every j = 0,1, . . . ,n. Once the coupons are exhausted (rational) customers will file all
claims. Of course, the refunds can be automatically delivered without the need for physical
coupons and mail-in redemptions, but the coupons may help customers conceptualize the
idea behind RVWs. Notice that any coupon framework ~r = (r0,r1, . . . ,rn) of size n+ 1
can be embedded into a longer schedule, say (~0,~r), by inserting a vector of zeros. Notice
that the two schedules have exactly the same refunds for the same number of claims. In
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particular, if j ≤ n claims are made the refund is rn− j and if more than n claims are made
then the refund is zero for both schedules.
4.3.1 Optimal and Heuristic Claim Policies
Customers of traditional, unlimited warranties have an incentive to file a claim for every
product failure regardless of the repair cost. Customers who buy an RVW need to decide
whether it is better for them to pay out of pocket for a failure or to use a coupon (resulting
in a smaller refund). This decision will depend on the time to go t until the end of the
warranty and on the number of claims k that he or she can make and still get a refund. It
also depends on the failure process. In this section we will investigate optimal and heuristic
claim policies, upon which the optimal design and pricing of RVW will be based. We will
see that an optimal claim policy is a function of the state (t,k). If k < 0, the customer has
already placed more than n claims and is no longer entitled to a refund. As a result, when
k < 0, it is optimal for the customer to file a claim for each failure. For k ≥ 0, we expect
the optimal policy to be of a threshold type, where a failure with out-of-pocket cost Ct will
be claimed at state (t,k) if and only if it exceeds a threshold a(t,k). We also intuitively
expect a(t,k) to be monotonically decreasing in t and monotonically increasing in k, which
is confirmed by our results under the assumption that the refund rk is increasing convex in
k.
While a dynamic threshold policy will be shown to be optimal, it may be quite difficult
for customers to conceptualize and compute it. More likely, customers will use a simple
heuristic to determine which failures to claim. At one extreme they will make all claims,
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essentially using constant threshold a = 0, or, more likely, they will use a combination of a
constant threshold policy and a limit on the number of claims, i.e., they will file up to j(a)
failures with repair costs larger than a. We will show that this heuristic policy is indeed
easier to solve and that its performance is very close to that of the optimal dynamic policy.
We now formulate the optimal claim policy as a stochastic optimal control problem.
Let g(t,k) be the maximum expected refund, net of out-of-pocket costs, at state (t,k) (so
n− k claims have already been made). We derive the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB)
differential and difference equation that must be satisfied by the value function g(t,k). The
HJB equation arises as the limit of a discrete-time dynamic program as the time increment
goes to zero. Since the failure process is as a non-homogeneous Poisson process, for small
δt , the probability that only one failure occurs in the interval (t, t − δt ] is approximately
e−λtδt λtδt ≃ λtδt , the probability of no failures is approximately 1−λtδt and the probability
of two or more failures is o(δt). By the principle of optimality, for k ≥ 0, we have
g(t,k) = λtδtE max(g(t−δt ,k)−Ct,g(t−δt ,k−1))+(1−λtδt)g(t−δt ,k)+o(δt).
Rearranging terms we obtain
g(t,k) = g(t−δt ,k)+λtδtE max(−Ct ,−∆g(t−δt ,k))+o(δt),
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where ∆g(t,k) := g(t,k)−g(t,k−1). We can rewrite the last expression as
g(t,k)−g(t−δt ,k)
δt
=−λtE min(Ct ,∆g(t−δt ,k))+ o(δt)δt .
Taking the limit at both sides as δt goes to zero we obtain the following differential and
difference equation
∂g(t,k)
∂t =−λtE min(Ct ,∆g(t,k)). (4.1)
The boundary conditions are g(0,k) = rk, k ≥ 0 and g(t,k) = 0, k < 0, for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T .
The following result confirms that a threshold policy is optimal with threshold a(t,k) =
∆g(t,k) equal to the marginal value, at time t, of the (n−k)th claim. The result also presents
monotonicity and convexity results.
Theorem 4.1. We have the following properties of optimal claim polices.
(a) Optimal Policy: When a failure occurs at state (t,k), it is optimal to place a claim if
and only if Ct ≥ a(t,k) = ∆g(t,k) and to pay out of pocket for the claim if Ct < a(t,k).
(b) Monotonicity: g(t,k) is decreasing in t and λs, respectively and increasing in k =
0,1, . . . ,n for all t ∈ [0,T ]. Moreover, g(t,k) is increasing in r j for all j = 0,1, . . . ,k.
(c) Convexity:
(i) Suppose rk is increasing convex in k. Then a(t,k) is increasing in k and decreasing
in t.
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(ii) If λt ¯Ft(x) is decreasing in t for all x ≥ 0, then g(t,k) is convex in t for any k =
0,1, . . . ,n.
As a direct application of the structural properties of g(t,k), we obtain the optimal claim
policy for discrete random failure costs. Suppose at any time t the failure has random cost
Ct that is discretely distributed taking value c j with probability q jt for j = 1, . . . ,J. We will
assume without loss of generality that the costs have been ordered so that c1 > c2 > .. . >






q jt min(c j,∆g(t,k)), (4.2)
with boundary conditions g(0,k) = rk, k ≥ 0 and g(t,k) = 0, k < 0, for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T .
We will assume that the refund schedule ~r = (r0,r1, ...,rn) is increasing convex. By
Theorem 4.1 part 3(a), the threshold a(t,k) is increasing in k and decreasing in t.
Let us denote by jk(t) the index of the lowest discrete cost c j that is greater than the
threshold a(t,k), i.e.,
jk(t) := max
{ j ∈ {0,1, . . . ,J} : c j ≥ a(t,k)} ,
where for convenience we define c0 = ∞ so jk(t) = 0 whenever a(t,k) > c1. Let S j :=
{1, . . . , j} for j ∈ {1, . . . ,n} and set S0 := /0. We will describe an optimal policy based on
claiming failures in the set S jk(t).
Proposition 4.1 (Optimal Policy for Discrete Random Failure Costs).
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ule is increasing convex then jk(t) is increasing in t and decreasing in k and it is optimal
to claim all failures in the set S jk(t) when a failure occurs at state (t,k).
The proof follows directly from the properties of a(t,k) and is therefore omitted.
4.3.1.1 Constant Failure Repair Costs
In this section we will consider the special case where customers are charged a constant
repair cost, say c, for failures. This practice may be employed when fixed travel or shipping
costs dominate the labor or part costs associated with a repair. This does not imply that the
costs to the repair service provider are constant, but merely that, as a policy, customers are
charged a constant amount for every out-of-pocket repair. By Proposition 4.1 there may
exist a threshold
tk := inf{t ≥ 0 : c ≥ a(t,k)}
such that it is optimal to claim a failure at state (t,k) if and only if t ≥ tk.
Proposition 4.2. If the refund schedule is increasing convex and r0 > c, then there exists a
series of thresholds 0 < t0 < t1 < .. . < tn. Moreover,






g je−Λ j(t)Λ j,k(t), t ≥ tk, (4.4)
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where








Λ j,k−1(s)λsds, t ≥ tk, j = 0, . . . ,k−1,
and Λk,k(t) = 1 for all t ≥ tk and all k = 0,1, . . . ,n.
The Jensen’s inequality implies that g(t,k) has a lower value when failure costs are
deterministic than when failure costs incurred by the customer are random (with the same
mean). Accordingly, customers will be willing to pay less for protection against constant
costs than for protection against random costs.
4.3.1.2 Exponentially Distributed Failure Costs
We now consider the special case in which repair costs Ct at any time t are exponentially
distributed with parameter ν = 1/EC. The following result gives the solution to the HJB
equation.
Proposition 4.3. The solution to the differential and difference equation (4.1) is given by








, k = 0,1, . . . ,n, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (4.5)
where R j := eν·r j −1 for j = 0,1, . . . ,n and P(t, j) := Pr(N(t)= j), where N(t) is a Poisson
random variable with parameter Λ(t).
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4.3.2 Static Threshold with Claim Limits Policy
With few exceptions, such as constant and exponential failure repair costs, g(t,k) and
therefore a(t,k) must be computed numerically. We now explore heuristics to approxi-
mate g(T,n), for any failure cost distribution, based on the use of a static threshold policy
a(t,k) = a for all (t,k), computed at state (T,n). For any a ≥ 0, the number of claims over
the life of the warranty is a Poisson random variable, say Na, with parameter Λ(T ) ¯F(a).
If the customer uses threshold policy a and is willing to make up to j ≤ n claims, his
expected refund is r(a, j) = Er(n−min( j,Na)), where r(k) = rk and his expected out-of-
pocket cost is m(a, j) = Λ(T )EC−E[C|C > a]E min( j,Na). Let l(a, j) := r(a, j)−m(a, j)
be the expected refund net of out-of-pocket costs. If j = 0, then l(a,0) = rn −Λ(T )EC.
For j = 1, . . . ,n, notice that
l(a, j) = r(a, j)−m(a, j)





(E[C|C > a)−∆rn+1−i)Pr(Na ≥ i).
For fixed a, l(a, j) is increasing in j as long as E[C|C > a] > ∆rn+1− j. The only sensible
choices for j are {0,1 . . . ,n,∞}. For j = ∞, l(a,∞) can be approximated by
˜l(a,∞) = Er(n−Na)+Λ(T )E[C|C > a] ¯F(a)−Λ(T )EC.
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Actually, l(a,∞) is
l(a,∞) = Er(n−Na)−E min(n+1,N)E[C|C ≤ a]F(a). (4.6)
The rigorous proof to equation (4.6) can be found in the Appendix A. We can also show that
˜l(a,∞)≤ l(a,∞).For any a, we will denote by j(a) the smallest choice of j∈{0,1, . . . ,n,∞}
that maximizes l(a, j) and let l(a) := l(a, j(a)). Clearly
g(T,n)≥ gs(T,n) := max
a
l(a), (4.7)
where gs(T,n) is the value of the best static threshold policy. The approximation of gs(T,n)
for g(T,n) is very good as suggested by the following examples based on the approximation
of exponential distribution and normal distribution. We will recover the usage superscript
that has been suppressed in the notation when considering multiple usage segments.
Example 4.1. Consider a problem with failure rates λi = λeφui , i = 1, . . . ,5, corresponding
to λ = 1, φ = 0.2 and usage rates u1 = 1,u2 = 1.2,u3 = 1.4,u4 = 1.6 and u5 = 1.8. The
corresponding failure rates are λ1 = 1.22,λ2 = 1.27,λ3 = 1.32,λ4 = 1.38 and λ5 = 1.43.
We will assume that time has been normalized to T = 1. The cost to repair a failure is
assumed to be an exponential random variable with ν = 0.02, so the expected cost is EC =
$50. The refund schedule is given by~r = ($30,$60,$90).
Table 4.1 gives the optimal constant threshold, the approximate expected refund net of
out-of-pocket costs based on approximation (4.7) and denoted by gis(1,3), and the optimal
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expected refund net of out-of-pocket costs gi(1,3) based on formula (4.5) obtained in sub-
section 4.3.1.1. Notice that the maximum error is 0.27% for market segment 5. Moreover,
the optimal threshold values ai are all close to $29≃∆rk = $30. For this example j(ai) =∞
for all market segments, so once ai is selected all failures with repair costs exceeding ai are
claimed. This is consistent with our analysis since E[C|C > a] = EC+a > ∆rn+1− j for all
j. The functions li(a) are fairly flat around the optimal value of a. For example, if we use
a = 30 = ∆r for all i then the largest error increases from 0.27% to just 0.30%.
Table 4.1: Quality of Static Threshold Approximation: Exponential Failure Costs
i ai gis(1,3) gi(1,3) error(%)
1 $29.13 $63.68 $63.75 0.12%
2 $28.93 $61.53 $61.63 0.17%
3 $28.81 $60.39 $60.51 0.20%
4 $28.68 $59.21 $59.34 0.23%
5 $28.53 $57.98 $58.14 0.27%
The next example shows that the approximation works well also when the failure repair
costs are normally distributed and the refund schedule is more spread-out.
Example 4.2. Let us suppose the cost C to repair a failure is a normal random variable
with mean µ = 50 and standard deviation σ = 10 and assume that the refunds schedule
is~r = ($50,$110,$175) with all other data the same as in Example 4.1. Table 4.2 gives
the optimal constant threshold, the approximate expected refund net of out-of-pocket costs
based on approximation (4.7) and denoted by gis(1,3), and the expected refund net of out-
of-pocket costs gid(1,3) based on numerical approximation using discrete-time dynamic
programming. Again, the optimal constant threshold approximation is very close to the
numerical solution.
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Table 4.2: Quality of Static Threshold Approximation: Normal Failure Costs
i ai gis(1,3) gid(1,3) error(%)
1 $67.62 $114.16 $114.35 0.17%
2 $67.61 $111.68 $111.89 0.19%
3 $67.60 $109.10 $109.34 0.22%
4 $67.59 $106.41 $106.69 0.26%
5 $67.58 $103.61 $103.95 0.33%
4.4 Expected Costs to Service Provider
When a customer chooses to pay out of pocket for a repair, his cost may be higher than
the repair costs that would be incurred by the warranty provider for the same repair. The
warranty provider’s repair costs are modeled here as βCt for some β ∈ (0,1]. Let hβ(t,k)
represent the warranty provider’s expected costs of repairs and refunds for a given RVW at
state (t,k). When β = 1 we will omit the subscript.
The partial differential and difference equation that hβ(t,k) satisfies under the assump-
tion that a customer follows the policy prescribed by Theorem 4.1 is
∂hβ(t,k)
∂t = λtPr(Ct > ∆g(t,k))
{βE[Ct |Ct > ∆g(t,k)]−∆hβ(t,k)} , (4.8)
where ∆hβ(t,k) := hβ(t,k)−hβ(t,k−1). The boundary conditions are hβ(0,k) = rk for all
k = 0,1, . . . ,n and hβ(t,k) = βE[∫ t0 λsCsds] for k < 0 and 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
We will now explore the relationship between hβ(t,k) and g(t,k) by introducing z(t,k),
the expected refund at state (t,k) under the assumption that a customer follows the policy
prescribed by Theorem 4.1. Following the construction for g(t,k) and hβ(t,k), it is easy to
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verify that z(t,k) satisfies the following differential and difference equation
∂z(t,k)
∂t =−λtPr(Ct > ∆g(t,k))∆z(t,k),
where ∆z(t,k) := z(t,k)− z(t,k−1). The boundary conditions are z(0,k) = rk for all k =
0,1, . . . ,n and z(t,k) = 0, for k < 0 and 0 ≤ t ≤ T . The following proposition expresses
hβ(t,k) in terms of g(t,k) and z(t,k).















z(t,k), where z(t,k)−g(t,k) represents customers self-defrayed repair cost under the opti-
mal claim policy and therefore the first term is the repair cost incurred to the RVW provider.
So, the RVW provider’s cost is composed of two parts: the repair cost incurred to the RVW
provider and rebates to customers. The rigorous proof can be found in the Appendix A.
As special cases, we have the following results to relate function hβ(t,k) to g(t,k) for
constant repair costs with mean ECt = c and exponential repair costs with parameter ν.
Proposition 4.5. If the repair costs are constant and the refund schedule is increasing
convex with r0 > c, then







r je−Λ j(t)Λ j,k(t), t ≥ tk. (4.11)














r je−Λ j(T )Λ j,k(T ).
Proposition 4.6. If the failure repair costs are exponentially distributed with parameter ν,
then for any 0 ≤ t ≤ T and k ∈ {0,1, . . . ,n},
z(t,k) =
∑kj=0 Qk− jP(t, j)







where Q j := r jeν·r j and R j := eν·r j −1 for j ∈ {0,1, . . . ,n}. Moreover,
hβ(t,k) = β[Λ(T )EC+g(t,k)]+(1−β)
∑kj=0 Qk− jP(t, j)
1+∑kj=0 Rk− jP(t, j)
. (4.14)
4.4.1 Discounted Costs
The following proposition extends the results to the case where future cash flows are dis-
counted at a rate α. The proof is omitted for brevity.
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Proposition 4.7. For any 0 ≤ t ≤ T and 0 ≤ k ≤ n,
∂g(t,k)
∂t = −λtE min{Ct ,∆g(t,k)}−αg(t,k)
∂hβ(t,k)






∂t = −λtPr(Ct > ∆g(t,k))∆z(t,k)−αz(t,k).










4.5 Design and Pricing of Residual Value Warranties
In this section we consider the warranty provider’s problem of how to design and price
an RVW to maximize profitability in a market with heterogeneous users. We assume a
heterogenous group of customers with random usage U . We will assume that U has a
discrete distribution qi =Pr(U = ui), i= 1, . . . , I with 0< u1 < ...< uI <∞ and ∑Ii=1 qi = 1.
We also assume that customers with usage ui experience failure rates λi that are increasing
in i, and that customers know their usage rates and the corresponding failure rates. The
warranty provider is assumed to know the failure rates and the distribution of U , which can
be estimated from historic data in practice.
We will develop two models that are helpful in guiding the design and pricing of RVWs.
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The first model assumes that customers compute the net cost of different EW products and
select the one with the lowest net cost. This is consistent with the assumption that the
decision maker is risk neutral, but assumes that customers can correctly evaluate net costs
without error and that they are otherwise indifferent to different providers. An alternative
model, allows for provider preferences and adds independent zero-mean random variables
to the net values of different choices. These zero-mean random variables can be interpreted
as errors in measurements or variations in valuations. We model the error terms as inde-
pendent Gumbel random variables, which leads to the celebrated multinomial logit (MNL)
choice model. When the variance of the error terms is small, the MNL coincides with our
first model, modulo provider preferences, by placing all the weight into the product with
the lowest net cost. On the other hand, when the variance is very large customers select
essentially at random as the first-order effect gets swamped by the error terms.
4.5.1 Models Based on Selecting the Lowest Net-Cost Product
Let wi be the maximum amount that a consumer with usage ui will pay for a traditional
warranty. Since the expected out-of-pocket cost of a pay-as-you-go repair service for such a
customer is λiT EC, it is natural to assume that wi ≤ λiT EC. However, an EW may provide
additional convenience in terms of product servicing that customers may also value. To
simplify the analysis we will assume that the customer is willing to pay wi = ¯βλiT EC
for some ¯β ≃ 1. We will assume that β < ¯β as otherwise warranties are not a profitable
business for the provider. In particular, if there are alternative warranty products with net
cost ¯βλiT EC < λiT EC then we would naturally model ¯β < 1. To simplify the analysis we
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will further assume that ¯β = 1 although all of the results can be reproduced for different
values of ¯β > β.
For any refund schedule~r = (r0,r1, . . . ,rn), we let gi(~r) denote the value gi(T,n) under
schedule~r for market segment i. This is simply the expected refund, net of out-of-pocket
costs, at the beginning of the extended warranty period. A customer from market segment
i has maximum willingness-to-pay
wi(~r) = wi +gi(~r)
and the expected profit to the warranty provider at this price from such customer is piiβ(~r) =
wi(~r)−hiβ(~r).
The following result demonstrates the monotonicity properties of the maximum willingness-
to-pay with respect to refund schedule as well as failure rate and when the expected profit
is maximized in a single market segment.
Proposition 4.8. The maximum willingness-to-pay wi(r) is increasing in each r j, T and λi,
respectively. Moreover, wi(~0) = wi. The expected profit piiβ(r) is maximized at r =~0 in a
single market segment. Moreover, piiβ(~0) = (1−β)wi.
If we offer price p and refund schedule~r, then market segment i will purchase the RVW
if and only if p ≤ wi(~r) and the profit from market segment i will be p−hiβ(~r). Thus, the







where δ(x) = 1 if x is true and is zero otherwise. From Proposition 4.8, wi(r) is increasing
in failure rate, so if this RVW is attractive to market segment j, all market segments with
higher usage rate will buy this RVW. For any fixed~r, the function G(p,~r) is increasing and
left continuous between consecutive values of wi(~r) and it follows that the function attains






be the expected profit under schedule~r at price p = w j(~r). For any given n, our objective is
to select the optimal~r for every j and then to pick the optimal j to solve max j max~r G j(~r).
We have therefore I optimization problems, each over n+ 1 variables. It is possible to
construct examples where the function G j(~r) fails to be concave and even fails to be uni-
modal. If the vector~r is constructed from fixed coupons of size ∆r, i.e., rk = (k+1)∆r,k =
0,1, . . . ,n, the problem of maximizing G j(~r) reduces to a single dimensional problem over
the parameter ∆r. We will abuse notation slightly and will denote by G j(∆r) the expected
profit of offering such a schedule with n constant coupons of size ∆r. It turns out, that even
G j(∆r) is not uni-modal. However, since this is a minimization over a single variable, it
is easy to find numerically the value of ∆r that maximizes G j(∆r). This allows us to then
select the market segment j∗ that maximizes G j = max∆r G j(∆r). While this is not an ele-
gant heuristic, it provides an easy way to obtain a sensible refund schedule (with constant
coupons) that is easily understood by the customer. Moreover, experiments maximizing
G j(~r) for general refund schedules using a general purpose non-linear optimizer for ex-
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ponential failure costs suggest that max∆r G j(∆r) is as high as max~r G j(~r) for large values
of n. In other words, constant coupon sizes perform as well as arbitrary refund schedules
when the number of allowable claims to yield a refund is large. While we cannot provide a
proof of this, it is encouraging to know that the heuristic performs well.
Proposition 4.8 says that in a single market segment, the optimal RVW degenerates to
a traditional warranty. However, RVW is more profitable for a heterogeneous market.
Proposition 4.9. If customers claim all the failures, then RVW would be strictly more
profitable than traditional warranty for a heterogeneous market. Moreover, we can design
some refund schedule such that it is optimal to claim all the failures.
In the following two subsections, we numerically show the RVW’s profitability.
4.5.1.1 Exponential Failure Costs





















j=0 Qn− jPi( j)
1+∑nj=0 Rn− jPi( j)
,
where Pi( j) := Pr(Ni(T ) = j) and Ni(T ) is a Poisson random variable with parameter λiT ,
R j := eν·r j −1 and Q j := r jeν·r j .
The following result demonstrates the monotonicity properties of the maximum willingness-
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to-pay with respect to refund schedule as well as failure rate and when the expected profit
is maximized.
Although Proposition 4.8 and 4.9 shows that RVWs do not improve profits from a single
market segment and are more profitable in several market segments as it can appeal to both
low and high usage customers. The following example illustrates this.
Example 4.3. We revisit Example 4.1 where there are five market segments. We further
assume that customers are equally likely to be of any of the five types. The best traditional
warranty will be priced at p3 = w3 = $66.16. This prices out of the market segments 1
and 2 and results in profits equal to $6.62, $4.19 and $1.66 from segments 3, 4 and 5
respectively and an expected overall profit of $2.49.
We consider an RVW with n = 8 and restrict the warranty to have constant coupons
of size ∆r. We maximize G j(∆r) over the five market segments and find j∗ = 2, coupon
size ∆r = 30 and price p = $304.88 result in expected profits equal to $2.99, which is
20.03% higher than what the optimal traditional warranty can offer. When we compare
these expected profits to those obtained from using a non-linear optimization software to
maximize G j(~r) over a general refund schedule with n = 8, we find we cannot improve the
expected profit relative to the constant coupon schedule. This suggests the restriction to
constant coupons does not lead to a significant loss of optimality. We further see that if
we restrict the constant coupon to n = 3, the optimal expected profit is $2.98 with j∗ = 2,
∆r = $31 and p= $127.49. This suggests that limiting the number of coupons gives up little
optimality but makes the entry price $127.49 (versus $304.88) more palatable to customers.
Table 4.3 illustrates how the optimal coupon ∆r, the price w j∗(~r), the profit G j∗(∆r) and the
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smallest markets segment served j∗ vary with the schedule length n+1. The first instance
corresponds to the traditional warranty.
Table 4.3: Performance of RVW as a Function of Schedule Length: Exponential – Base
Case
n+1 ∆r p = w j∗(~r) G j∗(∆r) j∗ Gain
trad $66.16 $2.49 3
1 $54 $85.33 $2.73 2 9.62%
2 $36 $104.76 $2.93 2 17.41%
3 $31 $127.49 $2.98 2 19.57%
4 $30 $154.92 $2.99 2 19.98%
5 $30 $184.89 $2.99 2 20.03%
6 $30 $214.88 $2.99 2 20.03%
7 $30 $244.88 $2.99 2 20.03%
8 $30 $274.88 $2.99 2 20.03%
9 $30 $304.88 $2.99 2 20.03%
Table 4.4 repeats the experiment with the same data except that now the repair cost is
exponentially distributed with mean equal to $100 and the failure rates are one half of what
they are before (as in Table 4.3). The optimal traditional warranty remains the same but
the value of the coupons essentially doubles and the expected profit grows slightly faster in
the size of schedule.
Table 4.4: Performance of RVW as a Function of Schedule Length: Exponential – Double
Cost
n+1 ∆r p = w j∗(~r) G j∗(∆r) j∗ Gain
trad $66.16 $2.49 3
1 $81 $114.30 $2.86 2 14.58%
2 $63 $160.37 $2.97 2 19.35%
3 $60 $214.93 $2.99 2 19.98%
4 $60 $274.89 $2.99 2 20.03%
5 $60 $334.88 $2.99 2 20.03%
6 $60 $394.88 $2.99 2 20.03%
7 $60 $454.88 $2.99 2 20.03%
8 $60 $514.88 $2.99 2 20.03%
9 $60 $574.88 $2.99 2 20.03%
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4.5.1.2 Numerical Example for Normal Failure Costs
Example 4.4. We assume the failure cost in the previous example is normally distributed
with mean µ = 50 and standard deviation σ = 10. Because the failure cost has the same
mean as in the exponential case, the best traditional warranty stays the same. We report
the optimal RVW design and its improvement over the traditional warranty in Table 4.5.
Table 4.5: Performance of RVW as a Function of Schedule Length: Normal
n+1 ∆r p = w j∗(~r) G j∗(∆r) j∗ Gain
trad $66.16 $2.49 3
1 $53 $79.34 $2.99 2 19.88%
2 $46 $105.43 $4.03 1 61.74%
3 $41 $136.56 $4.60 1 84.44%
4 $39 $170.51 $4.77 1 91.50%
5 $38 $205.34 $4.81 1 93.17%
6 $38 $243.30 $4.82 1 93.42%
7 $38 $281.30 $4.82 1 93.45%
8 $38 $319.30 $4.82 1 93.45%
9 $38 $357.30 $4.82 1 93.45%
The price of the traditional warranty only depends on the mean of the failure cost, while
the pricing of RVW depends on the failure cost distribution. Table 4.6 illustrates how the
improvements over traditional warranty change as a function of the standard deviation of
the normal distribution, assuming the mean stays constant.
Table 4.6: Performance of RVW as a Function of Standard Deviation: Normal, n = 3
σ ∆r p = w j∗(~r) G j∗(∆r) j∗ Gain
0 $49 $197.66 $6.31 1 153.14%
10 $39 $170.51 $4.77 1 91.50%
20 $37 $167.78 $4.08 1 64.00%
30 $40 $181.57 $3.84 1 54.24%
40 $45 $202.70 $3.81 1 52.92%
116
4.5.2 Multinomial Logit Choice Model
In this section we formulate the problem of how a service provider should optimally design
and price an RVW in a competitive market with heterogeneous users whose demand is
driven by a customer choice model.
A customer with usage ui who chooses service option j = 0, . . . ,m, will incur expected
costs J j(ui) during the warranty period. We refer j = 0 as the option of the RVW. In
particular, J0(ui) = p−gi(T,n), where gi(T,n) represents the expected refund net of out-
of-pocket costs (as developed previously), for a customer with usage rate ui. For other
service options J j(u) depends on the price and structure of the service terms and is assumed
known.








, i = 0,1, . . . ,m,
where γ > 0 is a choice sensitivity parameter, A(i) is the total attraction value excluding the
option of RVW. When γ is close to zero, customers are insensitive to costs and in the limit
they would be equally likely to select any of the products. When γ is large, customers are
very sensitive to costs and are likely to select the product with the lowest cost. Intermediate
values of γ arise as customers may have latent, zero mean, errors in valuating costs. The
total market share obtained by the RVW is S(p,r) = ∑Ii=1 qisi(p,r). The expected profit
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where hiβ(r) = h
i
β(T,n) is the expected cost incurred to the RVW provider for a customer
with usage ui. The profit pi depends on both the design of the RVW and the alternative
service products available on the market, so the goal of the provider is to select the price
p and refund schedule rn ≥ rn−1 . . .≥ r0 > 0 to maximize the expected profit per customer
assuming that expected costs of the outside alternatives J j(u), j = 1, . . . ,m are known.
The following monotonicity property of pi(p,r) will help us to design an efficient algo-
rithm to find the optimal price and refund schedule.
Proposition 4.10. pi(p,r) is increasing (decreasing) in p, when p is sufficiently small
(large).
Notice that a traditional warranty corresponds to the special case where the refund
schedule is~r =~0. Therefore, the best RVW will have an expected profit that is at least as
large as the expected profit from the traditional warranty.
Next, we will revisit the examples in section 4.5.1 by using MNL to formulate the
customer choice behavior. In order to compare with them, we assume the sole competitor
offers a pay-as-you-go service that has expected cost Λi(T )EC for segment i customers.





and the customer with usage ui will select the pay-as-you-go option with probability 1−
si(p,r). For simplicity, we will restrict the RVW to have the constant coupons with n = 3,
i.e., r = (∆r,2∆r,3∆r,4∆r).
Example 4.5 (Exponential Failure Costs). We revisit Example 4.3 of exponentially dis-
tributed failure costs with parameter ν= 0.02. Table 4.7 illustrates how the optimal coupon
size ∆r, the optimal price p and the market share obtained by the RVW vary with the choice
sensitivity γ. In Table 4.7, S(p,~r) represents the market share of the RVW or the traditional
warranty depending on which is offered and the last column is the improvement comparing
the profit from RVW with that from the traditional warranty.
Table 4.7: Performance of RVW under MNL: Exponential – Base Case
γ ∆r p S(p,r) pi(p,r) Gain
0.20 trad $69.0 38.13% $3.02RVW $13.5 $107.5 37.13% $3.12 3.41%
0.50 trad $66.5 48.02% $2.19RVW $23.5 $135.0 54.35% $2.56 16.82%
1.00 trad $66.0 51.38% $1.91RVW $26.0 $142.0 67.27% $2.48 29.72%
1.50 trad $66.0 51.41% $1.86RVW $26.0 $141.5 74.26% $2.46 31.87%
2.00 trad $65.6 55.36% $1.89RVW $26.4 $142.8 74.59% $2.45 30.03%
Example 4.6 (Normal Failure Costs). We revisit Example 4.4 of normally distributed fail-
ure costs with mean µ = 50 and standard deviation σ = 10. Because the failure cost has
the same mean as in the exponential case, the best traditional warranty stays the same.
We report the optimal RVW design and its improvement over the traditional warranty with
respect to the choice sensitivity γ in Table 4.8.
119
Table 4.8: Performance of RVW under MNL: Normal
γ ∆r p S(p,r) pi(p,r) Gain
0.20 trad $69.0 38.13% $3.02RVW $26 $138 41.14% $3.34 10.60%
0.50 trad $66.5 48.02% $2.19RVW $28 $140 65.80% $3.08 40.64%
1.00 trad $66.0 51.38% $1.91RVW $28 $140 72.14% $3.31 73.30%
1.50 trad $66.0 51.41% $1.86RVW $28 $140 74.13% $3.37 81.18%
2.00 trad $65.6 55.36% $1.89RVW $28 $140 74.77% $3.38 78.84%
4.6 Conclusion and Future Research
When designed correctly RVWs are especially helpful dealing with heterogenous market
segments as they present a mechanism to attract market segments that would be priced
out by traditional warranties. The mechanism does not require the monitoring of usage
or of the environment where the product is used as customers can influence their net cost
by taking into account their failure rates and the refund schedule. We have shown via
experiments that restricting the RVWs to have constant coupon sizes does not materially
reduce their effectiveness. This is a positive finding as constant coupon warranties are
easier for customers to understand and simpler to act upon. Moreover, our findings also
indicate that it is sufficient to consider refund schedules of modest length to obtain most of
the benefits that general RVWs can provide. This again, is a positive finding, as the refund
schedule can be kept simple and easy to use.
We have assumed that the warranty provider will automatically pay all refunds due to
the customer. We think this maximizes the valuation of RVW and the lifetime value of
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customers as automatic refunds will entice them to repurchase RVWs. In practice, it is
not uncommon for providers to observe low redemption rates that result from customers
not claiming eligible refunds. This happens when eligible refunds are relatively small and
the process of claiming them is time consuming. Customers who anticipate not claiming
eligible refunds may discount the upfront value of RVWs. Modeling redemption rates and
how such customers value RVWs is a topic of future research.
We have assumed that customers know their usage and failure rates, but have added
some uncertainty in their valuations by introducing idiosyncratic errors in valuations via
Gumbel distributions. These errors can also account for suboptimal valuations that result
from using heuristic claim policies, such as the static threshold policy described in the
chapter. The assumption that the warranty provider knows the failure rate distribution can
be defended by observing the claim behavior of high-usage customers who buy traditional
warranties and lower usage customers that pay for repairs out of pocket. Nevertheless, the
warranty provider may not be able to accurately estimate the failure rate distribution. In
this case, it would be important to design RVWs that are robust to such errors and that
allow for learning so that the provider can refine estimates over time.
One further research direction is to offer a menu of claim limited RVWs. These war-
ranties are similar to RVWs except that they do not allow for more than n+ 1 claims.
Offering a menu of claim limited RVWs may enable the provider to have even broader
market coverage and are particulary useful when RVWs price out the lowest market seg-
ments. Another research direction is to investigate how competing service providers may
respond to RVWs. In particular, it would be interesting to investigate whether the benefits
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of RVWs will prevail when competitors offer RVWs as well and whether offering RVWs
is a stable equilibrium.
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Appendix A
Proofs of Lemmas, Propositions,
Theorems and Corollaries
A.1 Proofs for Chapter 2
Proof of Lemma 2.1.










∂θi ≥ 0 can be shown by Cauchy-Schwarz inequality that is ∑
m
















maxs∈Fi βis ≤ w
Fi
i (θi)≤ 1mins∈Fi βis and the inequations become equations when βis is
constant for all s ∈ Fi.
























The inequality holds because of part (a).
Proof of Proposition 2.1.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that a















γi and rFii (ρi,p-i) can be written as follows
r
Fi
i (ρi,p-i) = ρi
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. So, rFii (ρi,p-i) is equal
to the minimum of HFi(θi) in θi, i.e., rFii (ρi,p-i) = minθi HFi(θi).
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i is the minimizer of HF
+
i (θi).
Therefore, rFii (ρi,p-i) is strictly increasing in Fi for any 0 < ρi < 1.
Proof of Proposition 2.2.
Proof. (a) Because Proposition 2.1 says that it is optimal to offer all the products at finite
prices, from equation (2.9),




Because the right hand side (RHS) of equation (A.2) is independent of j, then pi j −
ci j − 1βi j is constant for each j = 1,2, . . . ,mi from equations (2.9). Let θi = pi j − ci j −
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< ∞, the above equa-
tion can be rewritten as follows
















After some algebra, equation (A.2) can also be rewritten as follows
Qi(θi,θ-i)(θi +wi(θi)) = θi +(1− 1γi )wi(θi).
So, the total expected profit can be expressed as follows
Ri(θi,θ-i) = θi +(1− 1γi )wi(θi), (A.4)
where θi is a solution to equation (A.3). Furthermore, the optimal adjusted markup
is the solution that maximizes the expression (A.4). The proof to the uniqueness of
solution to equation (A.3) can be found in part (b) below.
























































We claim that (1− γi)wi(θi)vi(θi) < 1 for all θi under Condition 2.1. It is clearly
true if γi ≥ 1. If there are multiple products with different price coefficients then




(1−γi) imply that (1−γi)wi(θi)vi(θi)< 1;
otherwise wi(θi)vi(θi) = 1 for all θi and, clearly, (1− γi)wi(θi)vi(θi)< 1.
Therefore, ∂X(θi)∂θi < 0 for all θi under Condition 2.1, and X(θi) is decreasing from
positive to negative as θi goes from −∞ to ∞. Hence, Ri(θi,θ-i) is unimodal with
respect to θi and there exists a unique solution to ∂Ri(θi,θ-i)∂θi = 0.



































































· (1+(γi−1) ·wi(θi)vi(θi))≤ 0.
The inequality holds because either γi ≥ 1 or wi(θi)vi(θi) < 11−γi under Condition 2.1.
Thus, ri(ρi,p-i) is concave in ρi under Condition 2.1.
Proof of Proposition 2.3.
Proof. When Condition 2.1 is not satisfied, γi < 1. The profit can be rewritten in (A.4)
R(θi) = θi +(1− 1γi )w(θi), where θi is a solution to the FOC (2.15), so the optimal θi must



















γi mins βis .






Proof of Proposition 2.4.
Proof. (a) Let Fi be the set of products in nest i to offer at finite prices. The adjusted
markup of each product k ∈ Fi is constant, denoted as θi. Suppose the prices of all
products in other nests are given and denote total attractiveness of nest j as a j, j =
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1−ρ − (1+a-i) (A.6)
where a
-i = ∑ j 6=i a j. Given that the total market share is ρ and the product set in nest i
to offer is Fi, the adjusted markup is the unique solution to equation (A.6), denoted θFii ,
and the total profit can be expresses as follows
RFi(ρ) = Qi(θi,θ-i)(θi +wi(θi))+∑
j 6=i























(p js− c js)qs| j(p j),





















(p js− c js)qs| j(p j).
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Then, RFi(ρ) = minθi H
Fi




i ). Similarly to the proof of Proposition 2.1, we
can show that RFi(ρ) < RF+i (ρ) for any 0 < ρ < 1. Therefore, it is optimal to offer all
the products at prices such that the adjusted markup is constant in each nest.
(b) Let E be the set of nests whose adjusted markup satisfies equation (2.19). The total























θi +(1− 1γi )wi(θi) = φ, ∀i = 1,2, . . . ,n. (A.9)
The solution to (A.8) and (A.9) is unique, which will be shown later, denoted as φE and
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where φ = φE and θ = θE . Denote HE3 (φ) as follows






where θi satisfies (A.9). We will next show that HE3 (φ) is convex in φ.
∂HE3 (φ)
∂φ = ρ+ ∑i∈E
∂GE3 (φ)/∂θi


















































1− (1− γi)wi(θi)vi(θi) > 0
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Thus, HE3 (φ) is convex in φ.
Let E+ be the new nest set if the adjusted markup of another nest satisfies equation
(2.19). We can prove that RE+(ρ) > RE(ρ) by the same argument as in the proof of
Proposition 2.1. Therefore, it is optimal to keep the adjusted markup of all the nests
satisfies equation (2.19).












1− (1− γi)wi(θi)vi(θi) = 0, (A.10)
where θi is the solution to equation (A.9). Because ∑ni=1 γ
2
i Qi(θi,θ-i)vi(θi)
1−(1−γi)wi(θi)vi(θi) > 0 under
Condition 2.1, then, R(φ) is increasing (decreasing) in φ if and only if R(θ)≥ (≤)φ.
(i) Case I: there is only one solution to equation (A.10), denoted as φ∗. Apparently
R(φ) is increasing in φ for φ ≤ φ∗ and is decreasing in φ for φ > φ∗.
(ii) Case II: there are multiple solutions to equation (A.10). Suppose that there are
two consecutive solutions φ1 = R(φ1) < φ2 = R(φ2) and there is no solution to
(A.10) between φ1 and φ2. It must hold that R(φ) < R(φ2) for any φ1 < φ < φ2;
otherwise, there must be another solution to (A.10) between φ1 and φ2, which
contradicts that φ1 and φ2 are two consecutive solutions. We claim that R(φ)
is increasing in φ for φ ∈ [φ1,φ2]. Assume there are two points φ1 < φ′1 < φ′2 <
φ2 such that R(φ′1) > R(φ′2). Then, there must be a solution to (A.10) between
φ′1 and φ2, which also contradicts that φ1 and φ2 are two consecutive solutions.
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Thus, R(φ) is increasing between any two solutions to (A.10) and R(φ) may be
decreasing after the largest solution. Therefore, R(φ) is unimodual with respect
to φ.
(d) Let ρ = ∑ni=1 Qi(θi,θ-i), where θi is the solution to θi + (1− 1γi )wi(θi) = φ, ∀i =



















We can easily show that R(ρ) is unimodual in ρ by a similar argument to part (c). For




















The last equation hold because (1−γi)wi(θi)vi(θi)< 1 under Condition 2.1. Therefore,
R(ρ) is concave in ρ under Condition 2.1.
Proof of Proposition 2.5
Proof. From equation (2.19), the optimal φ∗ is one of the fixed points of R(φ) or, equiva-
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The inequality holds because wi(θi) ≤ 1mins βis for each i from Lemma 2.1 and it is not
optimal to sell any product with negative profit margin, i.e., pis− cis = θi +1/βis ≥ 0.
Proof of Proposition 2.6.
Proof. (a) Suppose that (p∗i ,p∗-i) is an equilibrium of Game I. From Proposition 2.2, the
adjusted markup for all the products of each firm is constant, i.e., pik − cik − 1βik is
constant for all k, denoted as θ∗i . We will argue that (θ∗i ,θ∗-i) must be the equilibrium
of Game II. If firm i is better-off to deviate to ˆθi, then firm i will also be better-off to
deviate to pˆi in Game I, where pˆi = (pˆi1 . . . , pˆimi) and pˆik = ˆθi+cik + 1βik . It contradicts
that (p∗i ,p∗-i) is equilibrium of Game I.
Suppose that (θ∗i ,θ∗-i) is an equilibrium of Game II. We will argue that (p∗i ,p∗-i) is an
equilibrium of Game I, where pik = θ∗i + cik + 1βik . If firm i is better-off to deviate
to pˆi := (pˆi1, pˆi2, . . . , pˆimi) in Game I, from Proposition 2.2 pˆik − cik − 1βik must be
constant, denoted as ˆθi. Then, firm i must be better-off to deviate to ˆθi in Game II,
which contradicts that (θ∗i ,θ∗-i) is an equilibrium of Game II.
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(b) Consider the derivatives of logRi(θi,θ-i):
∂ logRi(θi,θ-i)
∂θi
= −γi(1−Qi(θi,θ-i))vi(θi)+ wi(θi)vi(θi)θi +wi(θi) ,
∂ logRi(θi,θ-i)
∂θ j
= γ jQ j(θ j,θ- j)v j(θ j)≥ 0, ∀ j 6= i,
∂2 logRi(θi,θ-i)
∂θi∂θ j
= γiγ jQi(θi,θ-i)Q j(θ j,θ- j)vi(θi)v j(θ j)≥ 0, ∀ j 6= i.
Then, Game II is a log-supermodular game. Note that the strategy space for each firm
is the real line. From Topkis (1998) and Vives (2001), the equilibrium set is a nonempty
complete lattice and, therefore, has the componentwise largest and smallest elements,
denoted as θ∗ and θ∗ respectively.
For any equilibrium θ∗, θ∗ ≥ θ∗ ≥ θ∗ and
logRi(θ∗i ,θ∗-i)≤ logRi(θ∗i ,θ∗-i)≤ logRi(θ∗i ,θ∗-i).
The first inequality holds because ∂ logRi(θi,θ-i)∂θ j ≥ 0; the second inequality holds because
(θ∗i ,θ
∗
-i) is a Nash equilibrium of the log-supermodular game. Because logarithm is an
monotonic increasing transformation,
Ri(θ∗i ,θ∗-i)≤ Ri(θ∗i ,θ∗-i)≤ Ri(θ∗i ,θ∗-i).
Therefore, the largest equilibrium θ∗ is preferred by all the firms.
136
Proof of Proposition 2.7.
Proof. (a) Suppose that there exists an asymmetric equilibrium, denoted as (θ∗1,θ∗2,θ∗3, . . . ,θ∗n).
Suppose that θ∗1 is the largest and θ∗2 is the smallest without loss of generality, then
θ∗1 > θ∗2. Because the game is symmetric, (θ∗2,θ∗1,θ∗3, . . . ,θ∗n) is also an equilibrium. In
other words, the best strategies for firm 1 are θ∗1 and θ∗2 respectively corresponding to
other firms’ strategies (θ∗2,θ∗3, . . . ,θ∗n) and (θ∗1,θ∗3, . . . ,θ∗n). Since the game is strictly
supermodular and (θ∗2,θ∗3, . . . ,θ∗n) < (θ∗1,θ∗3, . . . ,θ∗n), then θ∗1 ≤ θ∗2, which is a contra-
diction.



























For the symmetric equilibria in an n-firm game, a





Y (θi) = −
(
























where Qi(θi,n) is the market share for firm i when all firms charge the same adjusted
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(i) If γi ≥ nn−1 , ∂Y (θi)∂θi < 0 for all θi.
(ii) If 0 < γi < nn−1 and maxs βismins βis ≤
1
1− n−1n ·γi







If there are more than one products and their price coefficients are not all the








Thus, ∂Y (θi)∂θi < 0 for all θi under Condition 2.2. Then, Y (θi) is strictly decreasing from
positive to negative as θi goes from −∞ to ∞. Hence, there exists a unique solution to
Y (θi) = 0 and it is also the unique equilibrium to the symmetric game.
Proof of Lemma 2.2.























The log-concavity of θi +wi(θi) can be guaranteed by θi ·
(−1+wi(θi)vi(θi))−wi(θi) ≤
0 because vi(θi) is decreasing from Lemma 2.1. We will next show that θi ·
(− 1 +
wi(θi)vi(θi)
)→ 0 as θi → ∞. Denote βi = mins βis and let Ξi be the set Ξi = {s : βis = βi}.
Then,
−1+wi(θi)vi(θi) =





















































In the above approximation, the higher order terms are ignored. Because βisβi +
βiβis −2 > 0

















→ 0, as θi → ∞.








) ·(∑s/∈Ξi eα˜is−(βis−βi)θi)→ (∑s∈Ξi eα˜is)2
as θi → ∞, therefore, θi ·
(−1+wi(θi)vi(θi))→ 0. There exists ˜θi such that
θi ·
(−1+wi(θi)vi(θi))≤ 1
maxs βis ≤ wi(θi), for θi ≥
˜θi.
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Thus, θi +wi(θi) is log-concave for θi ≥ ˜θi.
Proof of Proposition 2.8.

























The cross-derivative of logRi(θi,θ-i) is
∂2 logRi(θi,θ-i)
∂θi∂θ j








γ jQ j(θ j,θ- j)v j(θ j).
















γ jQ j(θ j,θ- j)v j(θ j)




under Condition 2.3(b). The inequality (A.11) establishes the uniqueness of the Nash equi-
librium to Game II (see e.g., Vives 2001).
If the equilibrium of a log-supermodular game with continuous payoff is unique, it is
globally stable and a tatonnement process with dynamic response (2.26) converges to it
from any initial point in the feasible region.
Proof of Proposition 2.9.
Proof. Suppose that Fi is the set of product to offer at prices such that equation (2.33) is
satisfied. Without loss of generality, assume that a
-i = 0. Consider the price optimization
problem with the market share constraint as follows:
r
Fi
i (ρi,p-i) := maxpi<∞ ∑k∈Fi(pik− cik)piik(pi,p-i)
s.t., Qi(pi,p-i) := ∑k∈Fi piik(pi,p-i) = ρi.
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We can easily show that at optimal prices (pi j − ci j)+ ai j(pi j)a′i j(pi j) is constant for all j ∈ Fi,
denoted as ηi. Then,
r
Fi
i (ρi,p-i) = ρi ∑
k∈Fi
(pik− cik)qk|i(pi)



























where ηi = ηFii and (pi j − ci j)+ ai j(pi j)a′i j(pi j) = η
Fi
i . Denote H
Fi
4 (ηi) as follows:

















































. The second order deriva-





















The last inequality holds because a′is(pis) ≤ 0 and 2(a′is(pis))2−ais(pis)a′′is(pis) > 0 under
Condition 2.4. So, HFi4 (ηi) is convex in ηi and r
Fi
i (ρi,p-i) = minθi H
Fi





Suppose another product x is added to the set Fi and denote the new set as F+i =Fi∪{x}.






i (ρi,p-i) for any 0 < ρi < 1. Therefore, it is optimal to offer all the product at finite prices
such that equation (2.33) is satisfied and the price optimization problem with multiple prod-
ucts can be simplified to an optimization problem in a single-dimensional space.
A.2 Proofs for Chapter 3
Proof of Lemma 3.1.
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Proof. Suppose that Rt+1(pt+1) = pt+1c∑Ti=t+1 ∏ij=t+1(1−q( j)). Then,
































The fourth equality holds because the updating scheme is a martingale and pt p+t+1 +(1−
pt)p−t+1 = pt .
Proof of Proposition 3.1.
Proof. For notational convenience, let Mt(pt) := Rt(pt)−Wt(pt). From equations (3.1)-
(3.3),
Mt(pt) = max{Rt(pt)−Bt(pt), 0} , (A.12)
where Rt(pt)−Bt(pt)= (1−q0(t))pt c−m+ pt(1−q0(t))Mt+1(p+t+1)+(1− pt)(1−q1(t))Mt+1(p−t+1).
Suppose Rt+1(pt+1)− Bt+1(pt+1) is increasing in pt+1, so Mt+1(pt+1) is increasing in
pt+1. For any p′t ≤ pt , p+t+1 ≥ p′+t+1 and p−t+1 ≥ p′−t+1 from Assumption 3.2. The situations
are different for q0(t) = 0 and q0(t)> 0, so we will discuss them separately.
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− (pt − p′t)(1−q1(t))Mt+1(p′−t+1)




The first inequality holds because Mt+1(p+t+1)≥Mt+1(p′+t+1) and Mt+1(p−t+1)≥Mt+1(p′−t+1);
the second inequality holds because pt ≥ p′t and Mt+1(p′+t+1)≥Mt+1(p′−t+1)≥ (1−q1(t))Mt+1(p′−t+1).














− (pt − p′t)(1−q1(t))Mt+1(p′−t+1)
≥ ((1−q0(t))c+(1−q0(t))Mt+1(p′+t+1)− (1−q1(t))Mt+1(p′−t+1))(pt − p′t)
≥ ((1−q0(t))c−q0(t)Mt+1(p′−t+1))(pt − p′t)
≥
(
(1−q0(t))c−q0(t) · (1−q0(t +1))c−mq0(t +1)
)
(pt − p′t)
≥ ((1−q0(t))c− (1−q0(t +1))c+m)(pt − p′t)
= ((q0(t +1)−q0(t))c+m)(pt − p′t)≥ 0.
The first inequality holds because Mt+1(p+t+1)≥Mt+1(p′+t+1) and Mt+1(p−t+1)≥Mt+1(p′−t+1);
the second inequality holds because Mt+1(p′+t+1) ≥ Mt+1(p′−t+1) ≥ 0; the third inequality
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holds because Mt+1(pt+1) ≤ (1−q0(t+1))c−mq0(t+1) ; the last inequality holds because q0(t +1) ≥
q0(t). So Rt(pt)−Bt(pt) is increasing in pt and Mt(pt) is also increasing in pt from equa-
tion (A.12). Because q0(t)≤ q0(t +1) and Mt+1(pt+1) ≤ (1−q0(t+1))c−mq0(t+1) , then from equa-
tion (A.12)
Rt(pt)−Bt(pt)≤ (1−q0(t))cpt −m+(1−q1(t)− (q0(t)−q1(t))pt) · (1−q0(t +1))c−mq0(t +1)
=
(
(1−q0(t))c− (q0(t)−q1(t)) · (1−q0(t +1))c−mq0(t +1)
)
pt −m+(1−q1(t)) · (1−q0(t +1))c−mq0(t +1)








The first inequality holds because
(1−q0(t))c− (q0(t)−q1(t)) · (1−q0(t +1))c−mq0(t +1) ≥ (1−q0(t))c−q0(t) ·
(1−q0(t +1))c−m
q0(t +1)
≥ (1−q0(t))c− ((1−q0(t +1))c−m) = (q0(t +1)−q0(t))c+m ≥ 0.
From equation (A.12), Mt(pt)≤ (1−q0(t))c−mq0(t) .
Proof of Theorem 3.1.
Proof. Part (a) is obvious from equation (3.3). For part (b), let
p∗t = inf{pt ≥ 0 : Rt(pt)−Bt(pt)≥ 0} , (A.13)
where pt = ∞ if the set is empty. Because Rt(pt)−Bt(pt) is increasing in pt from Proposi-
tion 3.1, then Rt(pt)−Bt(pt)≥ 0 for any pt ≥ p∗t and Rt(pt)−Bt(pt)< 0 for any pt < p∗t .
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Thus, the optimal policy has a threshold structure: it is optimal to keep buying the monthly
warranty if and only if pt ≥ p∗t . Because Mt+1(pt+1) ≥ 0 for any 0 ≤ pt+1 ≤ 1, then for
any pt ≥ m(1−q0(t))c ,
Rt(pt)−Bt(pt) = (1−q0(t))ptc−m+ pt(1−q0(t))Mt+1(p+t+1)+ (1− pt)(1−q1(t))Mt+1(p−t+1)
≥ (1−q0(t))ptc−m≥ 0.
Because Rt(pt)−Bt(pt) is increasing in pt , p∗t ≤ m(1−q0(t))c from equation (A.13).
Proof of Proposition 3.2.
Proof. It is sufficient to show that Rt(pt)−Bt(pt) is decreasing (resp., increasing) in m
(resp., c). Suppose that Rt+1(pt+1)− Bt+1(pt+1) is decreasing (resp., increasing) in m
(resp., c). Then, Mt+1(pt+1) is decreasing (resp., increasing) in m (resp., c) from equa-
tion (A.12). Because Rt(pt)−Bt(pt) = (1−q0(t))ptc−m+ pt(1−q0(t))Mt(p+t+1)+(1−
pt)(1− q1(t))Mt(p−t+1), then Rt(pt)−Bt(pt) is decreasing (resp., increasing) in m (resp.,
c).
Proof of Proposition 3.3.
Proof. Suppose Rt+1(pt+1)−Bt+1(pt+1) is increasing in pt+1, so Mt+1(pt+1) is increas-
















− (pt − p′t)(1−q1(t))Mt+1(p′−t+1)








The first inequality holds because Mt+1(p+t+1)≥Mt+1(p′+t+1) and Mt+1(p−t+1)≥Mt+1(p′−t+1);
the second inequality holds because q0(t)≤ q1(t); the last inequality holds because pt ≥ p′t
and Mt+1(p′+t+1)≥Mt+1(p′−t+1).
Proof of Lemma 3.2.
Proof. (a) Let Nt = at −a1 = at −a denote the number of failures that occur up to month
t. Then, pt+1 = (a+Nt+1)/(a+ b+ t). So, the Beta updating scheme is Markovian.
Since
pt+1 =
(a+b+ t−1)pt + It
a+b+ t = pt +
It − pt
a+b+ t ,






t+1 are both increasing in pt .
(b) For the Beta updating scheme,
E[pt+1|It] = pt p+t+1+(1−pt)p−t+1 = pt(pt +
1− pt
a1 +b1 + t
)+(1−pt)(pt− pt
a1 +b1 + t
)= pt.
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So it is a martingale.
Proof of Theorem 3.2.
Proof. Since the optimal policy has thresholds p∗t for the estimated failure probabilities
and the the estimate is updated following pt = (a+Nt)/(a+b+ t−1), the optimal policy
also has a threshold structure on the number of observed failures Nt . Then the optimal x∗t
can be found by solving
x∗t = min
{
xt ∈N : a+ xt





The threshold x∗t can also be expressed as follows: x∗t = ⌈(a+b+ t−1)p∗t ⌉−a, where ⌈y⌉
is the smallest integer number that is greater than or equal to y.
Proof of Proposition 3.4.
Proof. (a) Suppose that Rt+1(p) ≥ Rt+2(p), Bt+1(p) ≥ Bt+2(p) and Wt+1(p) ≥Wt+2(p)
for 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. Because q0(t)≤ q0(t +1) and q1(t)≤ q1(t +1), from equations (3.1)-
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(3.3),
Rt(p) = p(1−q0(t))(c+Rt+1(p+))+(1− p)(1−q1(t))Rt+1(p−)
≥ p(1−q0(t +1))(c+Rt+2(p+))+(1− p)(1−q1(t +1))Rt+2(p−) = Rt+1(p).
Bt(p) = m+ p(1−q0(t))Wt+1(p+)+(1− p)(1−q1(t))Wt+1(p−)
≥ m+ p(1−q0(t +1))Wt+2(p+)+(1− p)(1−q1(t +1))Wt+2(p−) = Bt+1(p).
Wt(p) = min{Bt(pt), Rt(Bt)} ≥min{Bt+1(pt+1), Rt+1(Bt+1)}=Wt+1(pt+1),
where p+ (resp., p−) represents the failure probability estimate in the next month when
the failure probability estimate was p and a failure occurred (resp., did not occur) in
the current month. Thus, Rt(p), Bt(p) and Wt(p) are all decreasing in t for 0 ≤ p ≤ 1.
(b) It is obvious that RT (p)−BT (p) ≥WT+1(p)−RT+1(p) = 0. Suppose that Rt+1(p)−
Bt+1(p)≥ Rt+2(p)−Bt+2(p) for 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. Then, Mt+1(p)≥Mt+2(p) for 0 ≤ p ≤ 1
from equation (A.12).
Rt(p)−Bt(p) = (1−q0(t))pc−m+ p(1−q0(t))Mt+1(p+)+ (1− p)(1−q1(t))Mt+1(p−)
≥ (1−q0(t +1))pc−m+ p(1−q0(t +1))Mt+2(p+)
+(1− p)(1−q1(t +1))Mt+2(p−)
= Rt+1(p)−Bt+1(p).
The inequality holds because q0(t)≤ q0(t+1), q1(t)≤ q1(t+1), Rt+1(p+)−Bt+1(p+)≥
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Rt+2(p+)−Bt+2(p+) and Rt+1(p−)−Bt+1(p−)≥Rt+2(p−)−Bt+2(p−). Thus, Rt(p)−
Bt(p) is decreasing in t for 0 ≤ p ≤ 1.
Proof of Theorem 3.3.
Proof. Because Rt(p)−Bt(p) is increasing in p from Proposition 3.1 and it is decreasing
in t from Proposition 3.4, then p∗t is increasing in t from equation (A.13).
Proof of Proposition 3.5.
Proof. Denote q0(t) = q0(t +1) = . . .= q0(T ) = q0. Assume that p∗+t+1 < p∗t+1 for some t.
Then, p∗−t+1 ≤ p∗+t+1 < p∗t+1, where the first inequality holds because of Assumption 3.2.
From equations (A.12) and (A.13), Mt+1(pt+1) = max{Rt+1(pt+1)−Bt+1(pt+1), 0} =
0 for any pt+1 < p∗t+1. Then,
Rt(p∗t )−Bt(p∗t ) = (1−q0)p∗t c−m+ pt(1−q0)Mt+1(p∗+t+1)+(1− pt)(1−q1(t))Mt+1(p∗−t+1)
= (1−q0(t))p∗t c−m.
The second equality holds because Mt+1(p∗+t+1) =Mt+1(p
∗−
t+1) = 0. Then, p∗t =
m
(1−q0)c from
equation (A.13). Because p∗t ≤ p∗t+1 ≤ . . . ≤ p∗T = m(1−q0)c from Theorem 3.3, then p
∗
t =




(1−q0)c . Since p
+
t+1 ≥ pt for 0 ≤ pt ≤ 1, then p∗+t+1 ≥ p∗t = p∗t+1, which
contradicts the assumption that p∗+t+1 < p∗t+1.
Proof of Lemma 3.3.
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Proof. Part (a) is straightforward. For the exponential smoothing mechanism,
E[pt+1|It] = pt p+t+1 +(1− pt)p−t+1 = pt((1−α)pt +α)+(1− pt)(1−α)pt = pt .
So it is a martingale.
Lemma A.1. (a) (Thomson (1994).) A continuous function f (·) on set C is concave if and
only if f ( y1+y22 )≥ f (y1)+ f (y2)2 for any y1 and y2 on C.
(b) If f (·) is a concave function, then f (y1)− f (y2)≥ f (y1+ε)− f (y2+ε) for any y1 ≥ y2
and ε ≥ 0.
(c) If f (·) is a concave function, then θ f (y1)+ (1−θ) f (y2) ≥ θ f (y′1)+ (1−θ) f (y′2) for
any y′1 ≤ y1 ≤ y2 ≤ y′2 such that θy1 +(1−θ)y2 = θy′1 +(1−θ)y′2, where 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1.
Proof of Lemma A.1.
Proof. (a) See page 121 on Thomson (1994).
(b) Because f (·) is concave, y1 = y1−y2y1−y2+ε · (y1 + ε)+ εy1−y2+ε · y2 and y2 + ε = εy1−y2+ε ·
(y1 + ε)+ y1−y2y1−y2+ε · y2, then
f (y1) ≥ y1− y2y1− y2 + ε · f (y1 + ε)+
ε
y1− y2 + ε · f (y2),
f (y2 + ε) ≥ εy1− y2 + ε · f (y1 + ε)+
y1− y2
y1− y2 + ε · f (y2).
So f (y1)+ f (y2 + ε)≥ f (y1 + ε)+ f (y2).
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(c) Let z = θy1 +(1− θ)y2 = θy′1 +(1− θ)y′2. So y2 = (z− θy1)/(1− θ) and y′2 = (z−
θy′1)/(1−θ). Then,


























































The first inequality holds because of part (b) and z ≥ y1; the second equality holds
because y1+ z−y11−θ =
z−θy1






+(1−θ)( z−θy′11−θ )= z−θy11−θ .
Proof of Proposition 3.6.
Proof. (a) Because Rt(pt) = ptc∑Ti=t ∏ij=t(1− q( j)), it is sufficient to prove that Bt(pt)
is increasing concave in pt . Suppose Bt+1(pt+1) is increasing concave in pt+1. Then,
Wt+1(pt+1) is increasing concave in pt+1. From equation (3.2), Bt(pt) = m+ pt(1−
q(t))Wt+1(p+t+1)+(1−pt)(1−q(t))Wt+1(p−t+1). So it is enough to show that ptWt+1(p+t+1)+
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− (pt − p′t)(1−q(t))Wt+1(p′−t+1)




The first inequality holds because Wt+1(p+t+1)≥Wt+1(p′+t+1) and Wt+1(p−t+1)≥Wt+1(p′−t+1);
the second inequality holds because Wt+1(p′+t+1)≥Wt+1(p′−t+1). So Bt(pt) is increasing














































































The first inequality holds because Wt+1(pt+1) is concave in pt+1; the second inequality
holds because Wt+1((1−α)pt)−Wt+1((1−α)p′t)≥Wt+1((1−α)pt +α)−Wt+1((1−
α)p′t +α) from Lemma A.1. Therefore, both Bt(pt) and Wt(pt) are concave in pt .
(b) Because Rt(pt) = ptc∑Ti=t ∏ij=t(1− q( j)) and it is independent of α, it is sufficient
to prove that Bt(pt) is decreasing concave in α, which is equivalent to showing that
ptWt+1((1−α)pt +α)+(1− pt)Wt+1((1−α)pt) is decreasing concave in α. For any
α′ ≤ α, pt((1−α)pt +α) + (1− pt)(1−α)pt = pt((1−α′)pt +α′)+ (1− pt)(1−
α′)pt = pt and (1−α)pt ≤ (1−α′)pt ≤ pt ≤ (1−α′)pt +α′ ≤ (1−α)pt +α. Because
Wt+1(pt+1) is concave in pt+1, from Lemma A.1,
ptWt+1((1−α)pt +α)+(1− pt)Wt+1((1−α)pt)≤ ptWt+1((1−α′)pt +α′)
+(1− pt)Wt+1((1−α′)pt).











































The inequality holds because Wt+1(pt+1) is concave in pt+1. So both Bt(pt) and Wt(pt)
are concave in α.
(c) Because Rt(pt) is independent of α and Bt(pt) is decreasing in α, then Rt(pt)−Bt(pt)
is increasing in α. From Proposition 3.1 and equation (A.13), p∗t is decreasing in α for
all t.
Proof of Theorem 3.4
Proof. The customer’s maximum willingness to pay for the traditional warranty is R1(p1).
Since pi1(p1,m∗,Q1)≥ 0, the monthly warranty is more profitable if and only if pi1(p1,m∗,Q1)≥
R1(p1)− S1(Q1) ≥ pit(p1,r∗,Q1). For the existence of the threshold, we will show that
pi1(p1,m,Q1)− (R1(p1)−S1(Q1)) is decreasing in p1, which is equivalent to showing that
pi1(p1,m,Q1)−R1(p1) is decreasing in p1 because S1(Q1) is independent of p1.
Denote q0(t) = q1(t) = q(t) for t = 1,2, . . . ,T. Suppose that pit+1(pt+1,m,Qt+1)−
Rt+1(pt+1) is decreasing in pt+1. For pt < p∗t , pit(pt ,m,Qt)−Rt(pt)=−(ptc∑Ti=t ∏ij=t(1−
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q( j)), which is decreasing in pt . For pt ≥ p∗t ,























The last equality holds because of Lemma 3.1. Moreover, it is easy to verify that
p+t+1− p−t+1 is independent of pt for the Beta updating scheme and the exponential smooth-
ing mechanism, so (1−q(t))(λ− pt)(p+t+1− p−t+1)c∑Ti=t+1 ∏ij=t+1(1−q( j)) is decreasing
in pt . Because both pit+1(p+t+1,m,Qt+1)−Rt+1(p+t+1) and pit+1(p−t+1,m,Qt+1)−Rt+1(p−t+1)
are decreasing in pt , then pit(pt ,m,Qt)−Rt(pt) is decreasing in pt . Therefore, pi1(p1,m,Q1)−
R1(p1) is decreasing in p1. Next, we will show that pi1(p1,m∗,Q1)−R1(p1) is decreasing in













The first inequality holds because pi1(p′1,m′∗,Q1) ≥ pi1(p′1,m∗,Q1); the second inequal-
ity holds because pi1(p1,m,Q1)−R1(p1) is decreasing in p1. Therefore, pi1(p1,m∗,Q1)−
R1(p1) is decreasing in p1. Thus, pi1(p1,m∗,Q1)≥ R1(p1)−S1(Q1) for p1 < po1.
A.3 Proofs for Chapter 4
Proof of Theorem 4.1.
Proof. (a) Optimal Policy: Consider the construction of the partial differential and differ-
ence equation (4.1) and notice that if a claim of size Ct occurs at time t, the choice
is between paying out of pocket obtaining expected payoff of g(t,k)−Ct or making a
claim and obtaining expected payoff of g(t,k−1), so it is optimal to make the claim if
and only if Ct ≥ ∆g(t,k).
(b) Monotonicity: To see that g(t,k) ≥ g(t,k− 1), notice that we can follow the opti-
mal policy as if k was k− 1 and obtain at least a large a payoff so ∆g(t,k) ≥ 0. By
equation (4.1), ∂g(t,k)/∂t ≤ 0 so g is decreasing in t ∈ (0,T ]. Since ∂g(t,k)/∂Λ(t) =
(∂g(t,k)/∂t)/(∂Λ(t)/∂t) = −E min(Ct,∆g(t,k)) ≤ 0, then g(t,k) is decreasing in the
failure rate. Let g(t,k,r) be the maximum expected refund, net of out-of-pocket costs,
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at state (t,k) for a refund schedule r = (r0,r1, · · · ,rn). Assume the customer still uses
the same threshold policy, when r j increases to r j + ε. As a result, the out-of-pocket
cost is the same, but the refund is larger for any realization of the failure process.
Under this policy, the expected refund net out-of-pocket costs is larger, so the maxi-
mum expected refund net out-of-pocket costs, i.e., g(t,k,(r0,r1, · · · ,r j + ε, · · · ,rn)) ≥
g(t,k,(r0,r1, · · · ,r j, · · · ,rn)).
(c) Convexity:
(i) By equation (4.1),
∂∆g(t,k)
∂t =−λtE [min(Ct ,∆g(t,k))−min(Ct ,∆g(t,k−1))], (A.15)
so the convexity of g(t,k) in k, i.e., ∆g(t,k)≥∆g(t,k−1), implies that ∂∆g(t,k)/∂t≤
0. Therefore, to establish part (a) we only need to show the convexity of g(t,k)
in k. We will show it by induction. As the initial step, for k < 0, g(t,k) = 0
and the claimed convexity of g(t,k) holds. Suppose there exists some k, such
that the convexity of g(t,k) holds for all j ≤ k. Due to the convexity of rk, we
have the convexity of g(t,k) holds for t = 0. By continuity, there exists ¯t, such
that ∆g(t,k+ 1) ≥ ∆g(t,k) for any 0 ≤ t ≤ ¯t. For a sufficiently small δ > 0, by
equation (A.15) we obtain the following difference equation








































∆g(¯t,k + 1)−∆g(¯t,k); the second inequality holds because of the assumptions
that ∆g(t,k+1)≥ ∆g(t,k) holds for any 0 ≤ t ≤ ¯t and that ∆g(t,k) is decreasing
in t. This establishes the convexity of g(t,k+ 1) for any 0 ≤ t ≤ ¯t + δ. We can
repeat the same procedure to extend the boundary and show that the convexity of
g(t,k+1) holds for any 0≤ t ≤ T . Then the desired result is proved by induction.














∂t dx ≥ 0
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The last inequality holds because each term is nonnegative by the assumption and
part (a).
Proof of Proposition 4.2.
Proof. Notice that tk = 0 when rk− rk−1 = ∆g(0,k) < c. Since we have assumed that the
sequence rk is increasing convex, a sufficient condition to ensure that all tk’s are positive is
r0 > c since then t0 > 0. Moreover, ∆g(0,k)> ∆g(0,k−1) for all k ≥ 1 so tk > tk−1.
For t < tk, the differential and difference equation has the simple form
∂g(t,k)
∂t =−λtc, (A.16)




0 λsds. The boundary condition forces rk = g(0,k) forces Ak = rk.
For t ≥ tk the differential and difference equation is of the form
∂g(t,k)
∂t =−λt [g(t,k)−g(t,k−1)]. (A.17)
We can solve this equation for state (t,k), t ≥ tk by using the threshold policy and
conditioning on the first failure. If the first failure occurs at time t − s ≥ tk then a claim
is made and the state drops to (t − s,k− 1). If the failure occurs at time t − s < tk then
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at tk we switch to the policy that never claims. To express the results more succinctly we
will introduce the notation Λ(s, t) =
∫ t















g je−Λ j(t)Λ j,k(t), t ≥ tk. (A.19)










g je−Λ j(t)Λ j,k(t).
Notice that the first term is λt gˆ(t,k−1) and the second term is λt gˆ(t,k), so we have
∂gˆ(t,k)
∂t =−λt [gˆ(t,k)− gˆ(t,k−1)].
Moreover,
gˆ(tk,k) = gk.
We have shown that gˆ(t,k) solves the differential and difference equation (A.17) and the
boundary conditions at tk, thus g(t,k) = gˆ(t,k).
Proof of Proposition 4.3.
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Proof. If Ct is exponentially distributed with parameter ν then









∑kj=0 Rk− jP(t, j)−∑k−1j=0 Rk−1− jP(t, j)
1+∑kj=0 Rk− jP(t, j)
.
On the other hand
exp(−ν∆g(t,k)) =
1+∑k−1j=0 Rk−1− jP(t, j)
1+∑kj=0 Rk− jP(t, j)
,
so the RHS of (4.1) is
−λtE min(Ct ,∆g(t,k)) =−λt
ν
∑kj=0 Rk− jP(t, j)−∑k−1j=0 Rk−1− jP(t, j)
1+∑kj=0 Rk− jP(t, j)
.
Thus, (4.1) follows.





Proof of Equation 4.6.
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Proof. Let g¯(t,k,a) be the refund, net out-of-pocket cost by using the constant threshold




Pr(C > a)g¯(t−δ,k−1,a)+Pr(C ≤ a)(g¯(t−δ,k,a)−E[C|C ≤ a]))
+(1−λtδ)g¯(t−δ,k,a)




Pr(C > a)∆g¯(t,k,a)+Pr(C≤ a)E[C|C ≤ a]
)
(A.20)
where ∆g¯(t,k,a) = g¯(t,k,a)− g¯(t,k−1,a). The boundary conditions are g¯(0,k,a) = rk for
all k = 0,1,2, . . . ,n and g¯(t,k,a) = 0, k < 0, for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T .









Then, we claim for any 0 ≤ t ≤ T and k = 0,1,2, . . . ,n, the closed form solution to
(A.21) is


























































































It is easy to very (A.22) satisfies the boundary conditions. In particular,
l(a,∞) = g¯(T,n,a) = Er(n−Na)−E min(n+1,Na)A
= Er(n−Na)−E min(n+1,N)Pr(C ≤ a)E[C|C ≤ a]
≥ Er(n−Na)−Λ(T )Pr(C ≤ a)E[C|C ≤ a] = ˜l(a,∞).
Proof of Proposition 4.4.
Proof. Equation (4.9) holds for t = 0, k ≥ 0 and for t > 0, k < 0 because of the boundary
conditions. By equation (4.9),
∂hβ(t,k)





= βλtE[Ct −∆g(t,k)]+− (1−β)λtPr(Ct > ∆g(t,k))∆z(t,k), (A.23)
where the last equality follows from the differential and difference equations defining
g(t,k) and z(t,k). By equation (4.9), ∆hβ(t,k) = β∆g(t,k)+ (1− β)∆z(t,k). Expanding
the right hand side of equation (4.8), we obtain
βλtPr(Ct > ∆g(t,k))E[Ct −∆g(t,k)|Ct > ∆g(t,k)]− (1−β)λtPr(Ct > ∆g(t,k))∆z(t,k).
(A.24)
Now, note that the right hand side of equation (A.23) is equal to expression (A.24) since
for any random variable X and any scalar x, P(X > x)E(X − x|X > x) = E(X − x)+.
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Proof of Proposition 4.5.









r je−Λ j(t)Λ j,k−1(t) = RHS.
Then, the solution to hβ(t,k) can be obtained immediately.
Proof of Proposition 4.6.





z(t,k)− z(t,k−1))1+∑k−1j=0 Rk−1− jP(t, j)
1+∑kj=0 Rk− jP(t, j)
. (A.25)
Substituting (4.12) into (A.25), the LHS equals
LHS =
−λt ∑kj=0 Qk− jP(t, j)+λt ∑k−1j=0 Qk−1− jP(t, j)
1+∑kj=0 Rk− jP(t, j)
− ∑
k
j=0 Qk− jP(t, j)(














1+∑k−1j=0 Rk−1− jP(t, j)
1+∑kj=0 Rk− jP(t, j)
( ∑kj=0 Qk− jP(t, j)
1+∑kj=0 Rk− jP(t, j)
− ∑
k−1
j=0 Qk−1− jP(t, j)
1+∑k−1j=0 Rk−1− jP(t, j)
)
which equals the RHS of (4.12). It is easy to show the boundary condition also holds, i.e.,
z(0,k) = rk. Equation (4.13) follows once we realize that the (4.13) is the derivative of
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νg(t,k) with respect to ν on account of Q j = ∂R j/∂ν. The expression of hβ(t,k) comes out
immediately from (4.9).
Proof of Proposition 4.8
Proof. From part b in Theorem b and the independence of wi with respect to r, the maxi-




∂t = λt (ECt −E min(Ct ,∆g(t,k))) = λtE[(Ct −∆g(t,k))
+]≥ 0






∂Λi(t)/∂t = E[(Ct −∆g(t,k))
+]≥ 0,
then, the maximum willingness to pay is increasing in failure rate. If the service provider
charges the maximum willingness-to-pay, her expected payoff is
piiβ(r) = wi +gi(r)−hiβ(r)
= wi +gi(r)−(β(wi +gi(r))+(1−β)zi(r))= (1−β)[wi +gi(~r)− zi(~r)] ,
where zi(r) = zi(T,n). By the definition, we can easily show that gi(r) ≤ zi(r) for all r.
Moreover gi(~0) = zi(~0). Therefore, piiβ(r) is maximized at~r =~0 and pi
i
β(~0) = (1−β)wi.
Proof of Proposition 4.9.
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where p is the price of the traditional warranty. We can design an RVW with upfront
price p+E[rn−N j ] such that market segment j and all above will be captured by the RVW,
where N j is a Poisson random variable with mean Λ j(T ) = λ jT . We will find some suf-















For simplicity, select equivalent coupon size, i.e., rn−k − rn−1−k = r0 = ∆r for all k =
0,1, . . . ,n−1. Then, ∂(Λi(T )EC+E[rn−Ni ])/∂Λi(T ) = EC−∆rPr(Ni ≤ n). If the coupon
sizes are equivalent and less then the expected repair cost, the maximum willingness to pay
Λi(T )EC+E[rn−Ni ]) is increasing in failure rate and market segment j and all above will






qi(p+E[rn−N j ]− (βΛ j(T )EC+E[rn−Ni ]))
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so E[rn−Ni] is decreasing in failure rate and E[rn−N j ] > E[rn−Ni ]. So far, we have shown
that RVW is strictly more profitable than traditional warranty if customers claim all the
failures.
Since repair cost is always strictly positive, if coupon size is less than each failure cost,
it is optimal to claim all the failures. Finally, we have designed an RVW that is strictly
more profitable than traditional warranty.
Proof of Proposition 4.10.














When p ≤ mini(hi + 1/γ), then, ∂pi(p,r)∂p ≥ 0, i.e., pi(p,r) is increasing in p when p is suf-
ficiently small. Notice γA(i)(p−h
i)
A(i)+e−γ(p−gi)
is increasing in p and γA(i)(p−h
i)
A(i)+e−γ(p−gi)
→ ∞ as p → ∞,
so there exist p¯i < ∞ such that γA(i)(p−h
i)
A(i)+e−γ(p−gi)
≥ 1 for all p ≥ p¯i. When p ≥ maxi(p¯i), then
∂pi(p,r)






In a generalization of the model in section 3.3, the product’s coverage status may affect
termination probabilities. To formalize this idea, let qc0(t) and qu0(t) be the period-t termi-
nation probabilities for a failed product with and without coverage, respectively. Observe
that, in this setting, the customer can influence the length of the horizon through his cover-
age decisions, since termination of coverage can lead to earlier product replacement.
The customer’s expected cost over periods {t, . . . ,T} of terminating coverage at state
(t, pt) is
RAt (pt) = pt(1−qu0(t))(c+RAt+1(p+t+1))+(1− pt)(1−q1(t))RAt+1(p−t+1) (B.1)
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with boundary conditions RAT+1(·) = 0. The customer’s minimum total expected cost over
periods {t, . . . ,T} of continuing warranty coverage in period t is given by:
BAt (pt) = m+ pt(1−qc0(t))WAt+1(p+t+1)+(1− pt)(1−q1(t))WAt+1(p−t+1). (B.2)
The optimal decision is the action with the smaller cost, so the customer’s minimum ex-
pected cost over periods {t, . . . ,T} is







with boundary conditions W AT+1(·) = 0.
Theorem B.1. Under Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2, if qu0(t)≤ qc0(t)≤ q1(t) for t = 1,2, . . . ,T,
(a) RAt (pt), BAt (pt), W At (pt) and RAt (pt)−BAt (pt) are all increasing in pt , for t = 1,2, . . . ,T.
(b) The customer’s optimal coverage policy has a threshold structure: there exists a se-
quence of {p∗t : t = 1,2, . . . ,T} such that it is optimal to buy coverage in month t if and
only if pt ≥ p∗t .
Proof of Theorem B.1.
Proof. (a) First, suppose RAt+1(pt+1) is increasing in pt . For any p′t ≤ pt , from equation
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(B.1)
RAt (pt+1)−RAt (p′t+1) = (pt − p′t)(1−qu0(t))c+(pt − p′t)(1−qu0(t))RAt+1(p′+t+1)
+ pt(1−qu0(t))(RAt+1(p+t+1)−RAt+1(p′+t+1))
− (pt − p′t)(1−q1(t))RAt+1(p′−t+1)+(1− pt)(1−q1(t))(RAt+1(p−t+1)−RAt+1(p′−t+1))
≥ (pt − p′t)(1−qu0(t))RAt+1(p′+t+1)− (pt − p′t)(1−q1(t))RAt+1(p′−t+1)
≥ (pt − p′t)(1−q1(t))(RAt+1(p′+t+1)−RAt+1(p′−t+1))≥ 0.
The first inequality holds because RAt+1(p
+
t+1)≥RAt+1(p′+t+1) and RAt+1(p−t+1)≥RAt+1(p′−t+1);




Second, suppose W At+1(pt+1) is increasing in pt+1. Since RAt (pt) is increasing in pt ,
that W At (pt) is increasing in pt can be implied by that Bt(pt) is increasing in pt from
equation (B.3). For any p′t ≤ pt ,








≥ (pt − p′t)(1−qc0(t))W At+1(p′+t+1)− (pt − p′t)(1−q1(t))W At+1(p′−t+1)




The first inequality holds because W At+1(p
+
t+1)≥W At+1(p′+t+1) and W At+1(p−t+1)≥W At+1(p′−t+1);
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Third, suppose RAt+1(pt+1)− BAt+1(pt+1) is increasing in pt+1. Then, RAt+1(pt+1)−
W At+1(pt+1) = max{RAt+1(pt+1)−BAt+1(pt+1) ,0} is also increasing in pt+1. For no-
















For any p′t ≤ pt ,
















))− (pt − p′t)(1−q1(t))






















− (pt − p′t)(1−q1(t))
· (W At+1(p′−t+1)−RAt+1(p′−t+1))













t+1) ≥ RAt+1(p′−t+1)−W At+1(p′−t+1); the second inequality holds because qc0(t) ≤
q1(t), RAt+1(p
′+
t+1)≥W At+1(p′+t+1) and RAt+1(p+t+1)−W At+1(p+t+1)≥RAt+1(p′+t+1)−W At+1(p′+t+1);
the last inequality holds because RAt+1(p
′+
t+1)−W At+1(p′+t+1)≥ RAt+1(p′−t+1)−W At+1(p′−t+1).
So RAt (pt)−BAt (pt) is increasing in pt .
(b) It is optimal to buy coverage in month t if and only if RAt (pt)≥ BAt (pt). Let
p∗t = inf
{
pt ≥ 0 : RAt (pt)−BAt (pt)≥ 0
}
.
Let p∗t = ∞ if the set is empty. Since RAt (pt)−BAt (pt) is increasing in pt from Part (a),
it is optimal to buy coverage in month t if and only pt ≥ p∗t .
Note that the condition qu0(t)≤ qc0(t)≤ q1(t) is not likely to hold in practice since cus-
tomers are generally more likely to replace an uncovered failed product than a covered one,
i.e., qu0(t)> qc0(t), and are more likely to keep a functional one, i.e., qu0(t)> q1(t), qc0(t)>
q1(t). Moreover, the optimal policy does not have a threshold structure for general termi-
nation probabilities.
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